Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎58v] (116/544)

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possibly, like himself as regards Persia, they saw no difference
between an alliance and co-operation. I bis point, however, did not
really affect their argument. The vierv of his department was that
it would be very difficult to press India any further in the matter.
Their argument was a powerful one, and as the Indian Government
had hitherto been successful throughout the war in their dealings
with the Amir, he thought that the Committee should trust their
judgment in the present case. He suggested the following draft
reply being sent to India :—
“ (Foreign Secret.)
“ Your telegrams of 1st July : Afghanistan.
“ His Majesty’s Government fully appreciate force of your
arguments against approaching Amir on lines suggested in my
telegram of the ^5th June. Point is one on which they feel
bound to defer to views of your Excellency’s Govermrent,
particularly in view of conspicuous success with which you have
handled Afghan affairs throughout war. But leaving aside
question of alliance, might not opportunity at least be taken to
advise Amir to be strong and prepared for all emergencies on
his northern frontier ? Subject to this suggestion, policy
recommended in your later telegram of the 1st July is approved.
With regard to your earlier telegram draft reply to Amir seems
to us open to criticism in certain particulars, e.g., passage
relating to alleged letter to German Emperor where action
imputed to Amir is first treated as enemy invention and
subsequently condoned and almost approved. But we recognise
that your Excellency must be best judge of line of argument
likely to affect Amir favourably, and on understanding that you
are satisfied that language of draft is best calculated to achieve
object desired, you are authorised to address Amir accordingly
with or without modification to give effect to our ^suggestion
regarding northern frontier. Your Excellency's Government
no doubt appreciate fact that whatever it ma) be desirable to
say to Amir, there is real danger of enemy ultimately developing
considerable strength on Afghan frontier.”
General Macdonogh said that he doubted if India really
appreciated the world-wide bearing of the present situation in the
Middle East. He thought they would gain valuable enlightenment
from a review of the Middle Eastern position made by the Chairman
at a recent meeting of the Imperial \\ ar Cabinet. He suggested
that a summary of the statement might be telegraphed to the
Viceroy. .
The Chairman said that it would be impossible satisiactoiii\ to
condense the argument he had elaborated at considerable length in
the statement referred to ; he had, however, no objection to a copy
of the statement in full being sent by mail to India.
Mr. Montagu said that the view of the Indian Government was
that if the policy suggested by the Committee were followed, it
would be construed as a sign of great weakness on our part, while
any overt action on the Amir’s part towards departing from his
neutrality and coming on to our side, might raise great popular
indignation and result in his being murdered or deposed. No argu
ment that we could use would dissuade him that it was not our weak
ness which induced us to approach him with a view to an alliance.
Mr. Montagu thought, therefore, that the Committee should accept
the advice of the Indian Government who, in their reply, should be
asked to lay special stress on the difficulty of meeting his wishes
in regard to arms, owing to our heavy military commitments in
different parts of the world. ,
The Chairman said he entirely agreed with the Secretary of
State for India. The question of the Amir, as he knew from his own
experience, was the most difficult problem with which the Indian