Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎54v] (108/544)

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The key to the solution of this problem lies undoubtedly in Afghanistan. The
Germans knew it when they sent Captain Niedermeyer and his Mission to the Amir’s
capital in 1915, to negotiate an alliance which was to come into active operation on
the appearance of a German army On the Afghan frontier. How are we to turn
that key so as to lock the gates of India against the advancing enemy? There is only
one way—Afghanistan must be induced to commit herself against our enemies while
their strength is still small in the distance, and while the British Star is still shining
in the East. The following extract from a report from Meshed, dated the 15th
June, is quoted in order to show that the moment, though rapidly passing, is not yet
past:—
“ From end to end of Turkestan he (a refugee Russian officer whose report
in other respects is fully confirmed) heard the English continually mentioned.
Their advent is expected and ardently desired particularly by the Turkomans
and Sarts in whom they place their sole hope of restoring orderly conditions.
Failing the English, a German occupation is regarded as probable.'’
On the 3rd January, 1918, the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. suggested the despatch of a British ^
Mission to Turkestan. The idea was encouraged by the War Office and the Foreign
Office, and it was warmly taken up by the Military Department of the Government
of India. The Foreign Department of the Government of India threw a wet blanket
over the proposal, but under pressure from the Home Government steps were slowly |
taken towards the despatch of Missions to two selected bases at Meshed and Kashgar.
"Hie present position is that the personnel of these Missions is at these bases, with the
exception of the Chief of the Meshed Mission. No British officer has, however, as
yet been allowed to enter Turkestan, although both the Consul-General at Kashgar
and the Military Attache at Meshed have advised in favour of this being done.
The Government of India are “ diffident about formulating any definite course
of action.” Let the War Cabinet decide, for such diffidence is the highway to
inaction and defeat.
The Government of India, while fearing that an inopportune endeavour to
negotiate with the Bolsheviks might harden their hearts against us (sic), yet recog
nise the importance of lifting the veil of political and military darkness which now
prevails over Central Asia. The latter argument is sound, but why consider the
Bolsheviks in this region where they cannot even claim a shadowy right to be
regarded as the de facto government of the country? Tenderness towards the
Bolsheviks on the part of the Allies has already placed European Russia in the hands
of the Germans and Siberia within their reach. If a similar policy is adopted in
Turkestan, Afghanistan will shortly be within the grasp of the Central Powers.
We should send our agents into Turkestan in order to obtain for us military and
political intelligence, so as to ensure that our policy (both military and political)
moves on sound lines. Meanwhile, with what are we to oppose the coming
German advance towards Afghanistan? There is only one possible instrument—
the Afghan Army. The Amir has himself given us a pretext for approaching him,
by putting forward a demand (a ridiculously extravagant demand) for arms and f
ammunition. Certainly no British or Indian Government could contemplate the |
despatch of munitions of war up the Khyber on a large scale at such a time as the
present. If, however, the Amir is sincere, and it is believed that he sincerely desires
at any rate, to avert the pressure which would be brought on him by the extension v
of German power on his Northern frontier, let us invite his co-operation in resisting
that menace which is as much opposed to his interests as to those of the British
Empire. It is submitted that the Amir should be encouraged to occupy the Murghab
Valley from Merv to Kushk, and to assist the Emir of Bokhara in holding and con
trolling the Bokharan Railway. The occupation of the Murghab Valley, including
the lost Afghan territory of Pendjeh would prove an attractive bait to the Amir.
No false sentiments towards Russia should deter us from offering the Amir this
bribe. All loyal and educated Russians recognise that Russia must pay a price to
be saved from further destruction by Germany, and no such Russian would grudge
the Amir this small patch of territory as a reward for his assistance.
Regarding the matter from another point of view, it is certain that if the
Germans once effectively occupy Turkestan, they will be ready to give the Amir a
far larger slice of Russian territory as a reward for his co-operation. It is suggested
that the Amir should be invited to act at once, and to despatch a Mission to Meshed
to consult with the British Mission at that place with regard to British co-operation.