Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎54r] (107/544)

In some cases the statements of Dominion
Ministers had been almost entirely rewritten.
Consequently, this alternative would probably not
appreciably relieve members of the Committee oi
the burden of scrutiny.
(2.) It would involve a departure from the practice
followed in the case of War Cabinet Meetings.
The Committee, after a brief discussion, decided:
That the 'present procedure should continue to be followed.
(Initialled) C. of K.
2, Whitehall Gardens,
2bth June, 1918.
APPENDIX.
British Policy in Afghanistan find Turkestan.
Note by C.I.G.S.
THE policy adopted by the Government of India with regard to Afghanistan
since the early days of the war has been to place the Amir within a ring fence
designed to prevent the penetration into Afghanistan of the disturbing influences ot
the war or the actual entry of enemy agents. Having completed this fence by linking
up the Sistan Field Force with a .Russian cordon in North-East Persia, the Govern
ment of India has consistently adhered to the policy of avoiding any action such as
might stir up the hornets’ nest in which the Amir's subjects live but do not rest.
This policy has been fully justified by the success with which it has been
rewarded, but that part of the fence which lay along the Northern frontier of
Afghanistan has been torn down by the Russian Revolution, and the conversion ol the
Sistan Field Force into the East Persia cordon, extending from Khwash to Meshed,
still leaves the Russo-Afghan frontier open not only to the physical approach of
enemy agents, but to all the exciting influences which spring from the present chaos
in Russia and the German advance towards the Caspian.
The situation of Afghanistan has thus undergone a very material change, and
it is urgently necessary that His Majesty’s Government should frame a policy to
meet the changed situation.
The ring-fence round Afghanistan is now only two-thirds of a circumference,
and it is no longer safe to pursue the policy of “ let w r ell alone. If w r e attempt to
do so, we shall soon find that under the influence of enemy agents “ well ” has become
ill,” and that the Amir has joined the ranks of our enemies.
This is no pessimistic prophecy, but is a plain statement of an eventuality
which is inevitable unless counter-measures are taken immediately. Ihe German
wave, having rolled over the Ukraine with almost incredible rapidity, is sweeping
over the Don basin towards the Volga. In the Trans-Caucasus German troops are
in occupation of Till is, and are only waiting for promised reinfoi cements to con
tinue their advance on Baku. In lurkestan there are 40,000 German and Austrian
prisoners of war. \Ve are told, it is true, that they are practically starving with no
prestige in German eyes, but Sir George Macartney adds the rider that they w ill
remain passive in default of a leader with funds and arms. How long will the
Germans allow us before supplying those wants? 1 he answer may be taken from the
mouths of the German agents who are reported as being particularly acti\e in
Tashkend, where they are visiting the leading Moslems regularly, and telling them
that in two or three months Germany^ will be in occupation of lurkestan. How then
is this great and imminent menace to the security of India to be averted? (It must
be remembered that if this menace is alkwved to develop into a reality, it means the
locking up for the internal and external defence of India of troops and other militaiy
resources which are vital to the prosecution of the war in other theatres.)
[365—15]
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