Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎52v] (104/544)

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General Smuts remarked that our very presence at Hamadan
was a violation of the Convention.
Mr. Montagu thought that the terms we offered should include
the abrogation of the Convention which had been denounced by
the only .Russian Government in existence, and, moreover, was
inconvenient to us.
The Chairman said it was a question whether they should say
that the Convention was in suspense or cancelled, and the argu
ments on both sides appeared to be about equal.
Mr. Montagu doubted whether advantage was to be derived
from consulting Marling, who had been identified with a quite
different policy. Would he enter enthusiastically into a new
policy? Time was pressing, and it was important that whatever
decision was arrived at, we should get to work without delay. He
suggested that, as we got our information from many different
people in Persia, we might consult some of our other officers, e.g.,
Colonel Stokes and Colonel Gough.
Mr. Oliphant pointed out that Colonel Gough knew nothing
about the situation at Teheran, and that it would be difficult to
get into touch with Stokes, who had not been heard of since he
went off on the 3rd June to meet Kuchik Khan, the chief of the
Jangalis. He reminded the Committee that Marling had now
advocated the policy of an alliance with Persia for over a year,
although His Majesty's Government had not so far consented to
its adoption.
Mr. Montagu suggested that it might be possible to send
Stokes as our pro tempore agent to negotiate the new agreement.
General Macdonogh suggested, in regard to the suggested
change in our representative at Teheran, that our policy in Persia
might be handed over to the Indian Government, who should be
invited to send an official to go to Teheran.
The Chairman pointed out that, as Lord Hardinge knew well,
the Persian Government distrusted all Indian officials as being
bureaucratic and unsympathetic.
Mr. Balfour said that he himself was all in favour of a policy
of concilation but he doubted whether we should obtain, by an
alliance, anything beyond what we got at present.
Mr. Montagu thought that, in the present situation, there
were grounds for a certain amount of optimism, and we ought to
seize, and make the best of, our present opportunity. The Persian
nation believed that, by our Convention with Russia, we had
practically divided up the country between two foreign nations;
they felt, moreover, strongly on the subject of a Persian national
army ; and they regarded us as steadfastly opposed to nationalism
m Persia. Further, Mr. Dobbs, and those who agreed with him,
thought that it would be easy to get in young Persia on our side,
if we only went about it the right way.
Mr. Oliphant said that Marling had suggested that, if we
handed over the South Persia Rifles to the Persian Government,
this would be an earnest of our good faith.
Mr. Montagu hoped that any telegram that was sent to the
Viceroy of India might include an intimation that His Majesty’s
Government were giving their sympathetic consideration to the
policy advocated by the Government of India.
The Committee decided —
(a.) That the Foreign Office should be asked to draft a tele
gram to Sir Charles Marling based upon General
Wilsons Memorandum, and embodying the views
expressed at the mooting, and asking for his opinion,
and that the drgft should be submitted to the India
Office, the Wa,r Office, and the Chairman for approval
before despatch.