Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎52r] (103/544)

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Dobbs, an Indian civilian of much experience and knowledge of
Persia, who thought tliat Mailing’s influence in Persia was
impaired by his supposed anti-democratic prejudices.
Mr. iViontagu said he had met and talked with Mr. Dobbs in
India since the letter quoted by the Chairman had been written.
Mr. Dobbs had then told him that if we were to try a new policy
in Persia, we must have a new man at Teheran to carry it through,
as Marling was regarded by the Persians as associated with the
old and hated policy which tound expression in the Anglo-Russian
Convention. Put had we a new policy? We were now talking of
paying a very big price, i.e. y handing over the South Persia Rifles,
of denouncing the Anglo-Russian Convention, and of agreeing to
the formation of a national Persian army. But what was to be
our return? He did not think it would be an adequate one unless
Persia committed herself to a definite alliance with us. He him
self advocated telling Persia that we were willing to give her our
active co-operation in fighting our common enemies, and that she,
, in her turn, must get rid of enemy agents, and refrain from un
friendly action of every kind.
The Chairman said he was not quite clear that the dangers of
an alliance might not outweigh the advantages, e.g. y the former
might possibly include a demand that we should guarantee the
integrity of the borders of Persia.
Lord Hardinge pointed out that we were already pledged to
this by a treaty, which committed us to it, although by that treaty
we guaranteed the integrity of her territories against Russia, and
not Turkey or Germany.
The Chairman enquired whether we were committed by an
actual treaty or had merely given assurances.
Mr. Oliphant said that, so far as his memory went, there was
no signed agreement on our part actively to defend Persian
territory.
The Chairman thought that, in any case, Marling must be
consulted before the policy was decided upon. He suggested that
the case as discussed to-day, should be put before Marling, who
should be informed as to the price we were disposed to pay. The
case could be based upon the views expressed at that meeting, and
upon the note by the C.I.G.S. We should further ask Marling if,
and how, we could get rid of Samsam-Es-Sultaneh, and get in
Vossugh. Would it be sufficient to secure a friendly Persian
Government without an alliance, and would an alliance, in
Marling’s opinion, be too big a price to pay?
Mr. Montagu suggested that the word “ alliance ” need not be
used in the message, if it was quite clear that Persia would take
* action against and permit us to take action against the enemy.
General Smuts thought that all Mr. Montagu wished was that
Persia should come in definitely on our side.
Mr. Balfour said that we w^ere prepared now to offer a higher
price, but it was in order to secure more thereby, viz., a definite
pronouncement on the part of Persia that she was on our side. In
his view, we were not offering Persia enough to induce her to
fight, and so he did not think we should get what we wanted. In
return for the South Persia Rifles, we were asking for Persia’s
active participation in the war. He did not think it right to
denounce a treaty we had made with Russia so long as there was
no Russian Government with whom we could negotiate. He would
prefer to tell Persia that we regarded the Anglo-Russian Conven
tion as in abeyance.
The Chairman remarked that the Anglo-Russian Convention
was really an obsession with the Persian Government, and that
the Convention was already dead. He thought it inconceivable
that the conditions which obtained at the time that the Convention
was signed would ever be reproduced in the future.
Mr. Balfour was inclined to think that the existence of the
Convention w r as, on the v r hole. rather advantageous to us.
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