Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎46v] (92/544)

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area. By our present action,, we were neither getting Persia on our
side, nor were we pursuing a sufficiently active policy against her.
If we failed to get a Persian Government to ally itself with us r
then we might have to send troops to South Persia-. Our troubles
there were mainly political. What was needed was unification and
decentralisation. He, himself, would abolish Sir C. Marling s
appointment, and place political activities in Persia under the Indian
Government He did not think it was possible to spht up Persia as
had been suggested by the Chairman. He agreed, however, to the
control of the Ramadan road and of Dunsterville’s operations being
retained by General Marshall. For the rest, he did not think that
the present proposal went far enough.
The Chairman said that his proposal was only intended to
deal with the situation as it now was. The trouble and confusion
in South Persia were due to the fact that Sykes and the South
Persia Rifles were shut up in Shiraz, and it was because of tb s
military danger that we had had to send troops to Bundar Abbas
and Bush ire. For the moment it was this danger that had to
be met.
General Smuts said that he was in favour of leaving Sykes in
charge of the South Persia Rifles. He agreed that General
Marshall s campaign was now being deflected into Persia, and he would
accordingly put the Hamadan road, and Ahwaz, Dizful, and
Bakhtiariland, under that General. As regards the question whether
the military command in South Persia should be under General
Marshall or the Indian Government, he thought there was much to
be said on both sides, but he inclined to the latter solution. He
agreed with Mr. Montagu that our troubles there were political in
their character. He also agreed with the Chairman that the
larger question could not properly be settled until the present mess
had been cleaned up.
(At this point General Smuts was summoned away from the meeting.)
The Chairman pointed out that at present we had not in Persia
a Government friendly to us. His view had been that if, and when,
Vossugh became Prime Minister, we might either disband, or hand
over to the Persian Government, the South Persia Rifles after (oh we
were free from the present anxiety, and (b) we had a friendly
Government in power.
Mr. Montagu said that if Marling were told to say that given a
friendly Government we would disband or hand over the South
Persia Rifles, he believed that Vossugh would form a Government
and our troubles with Soulet would be over.
Mr. Oliphant said that he had been told by the Persian Minister
that if we showed our willingness either to disband, or to let the
Persian Government do exactly what they liked with, the South
Persia Rifles, very great improvement in our position in the country
might be expected.
The Chairman pointed out the danger of 6,000 armed and dis
banded men wandering about in South Persia.
General Macdonogh said that it was particularly necessary that
thev should not be allowed to get into the hands of assmuss.
Mr. Montagu suggested that one point of the bargain should be
the suppression of Wassmuss’s activities. Further, we would make
a promise that we would hand over the South Persia Rifles on
condition that a Government friendly to us was formed. He was
most unwilling to appear obstructive, but he must point out that
once troops were brought up towards Shiraz, it would be most
difficult to reinforce them. He thought that we should start nego-
tiati ns with the Persian Government before we moved any troops.
Lord Hardinge said that he agreed with Mr. Montagu and
thought that negotiations should precede any movement of troops.
The Chairman said that if we were to negotiate we must be sure
of getting the right Prime Minister in power.