Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎42v] (84/544)

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South Persia.
Position of
Sir P. Sykes.
whether it would be possible to lay mine-fields at Enzeli, the
Admiralty had reported—
(a.) It was hardly feasible, on account of the difficulties of
transportation ;
(6.) That it was unnecessary, as artillery would suffice to sink
the fleet;
(c.) That, as regards hydroplanes, they would be useful to spot
for our guns at Enzeli, but Baku was out of hydroplane
range, unless the hydroplanes could be taken part of the
way by sea.
Further definite information received by us was to the effect
that two more German battalions and two batteries were on
their wav from Ukraine, that there was an enemy aerodrome at
Tiflis, and also that the 3rd Turkish Army now advancing in the
Caucasus was to be maintained at its full strength.
In reply to a question, Mr. Oliphant said that the journey from
Baku to Enzeli took eighteen hours.
The Chairman stated that he had seen in the paper that
morning that the Turks were at Tabriz. He thought a most dis
couraging fact was the changed attitude of the Bolsheviks. Lenin
now said that he would oppose the landing of any British at Baku.
Mr. Balfour though the whole situation was most disquieting.
The Chairman said our almost hopeless position was due to
two things—our lack of military strength, and geographical diffi
culties.
The Committee decided —
(a.) That their present instructions to the G.O.C,, Mesopotamia,
should stand;
(b.) That General Marshall should he informed that we agreed
with him that the report of the British officer with
Bicharokoff should he awaited before those instructions
were reconsidered.
4. The Chairman said that in the absence of the Secretary of
State for India he thought the discussion of Sir P. Sykes’ position
must be deferred. There were two points to be decided—one
political and one military. There was some feeling between Sykes
and Marling on account of the Political Officer at Shiraz, who was
corresponding with Marling, Sir P. Sykes thought, behind the latter’s
back. The Committee had to determine the exact meaning of their
instructions that Sykes should be placed under the Commander-in-
Chief in India. He did not think this would be difficult, as Sykes
would be under Sir Charles Monro for all military matters. Arising
from this, however, there was, as Mr. Montagu said, a larger ques
tion, that of the military control of the whole of the operations. In
the days of the Persian Committee the Government of India had
proposed that an Indian General should be sent to command all the
troops in South Persia. That Committee had not favoured the
proposal, as it meant a fresh military area. Now, however, as
military operations were actually taking place, and as Sykes had no
recent military experience, it seemed evident that a military com
mander was necessary. Sir Charles Marling was right in his view
that Sykes, as officer commanding the South Persia Rifles, was
really a servant of the Persian Government.
General Macdonogh thought that the Chief of the Imperial
Staff would probably agree to asking the Commander-in-Chief in
India to send out an officer to command Persia with bis head-