Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎42r] (83/544)

had wired that the Bolsheviks had forbidden him to use the wireless
station officially, and that he had been refused permission to proceed to
Enzeli. General Marshall also forwarded a report, dated the 13th June,
from General Dunsterville, which said that if Baku was held we
should control the Caspian shipping, and there should be no difficulty
in maintaining communications with Enzeli ; he could not give a
guarantee to supply Baku with ammunition, but he believed there
was a good supply there ; that he had no intention of keeping many
troops in or near Enzeli, but only enough to guarantee the safety of
the road until the Jangali situation was certain. General Dunster
ville further reported that the Baku—Batoum Railway was in a bad
state which would delay the hostile advance; that he understood
that there were thirty-three guns now in efficient order at Baku, and
if he could put 10,000 troops in action as promised, the Turko-
German advance would be checked for many months ; that the
Armenians were fighting for their lives and would hold out to the
last; and that if the situation proved to be better than he thought,
he would have again to ask for troops. General Marshall’s comment
on this was that we should await the report of the British officer
accompanying Bicharakoff, and he said that he had told Dunsterville
that be did not intend to send him any more troops without permis
sion from England, and had that day drawn his attention once more
to the fact that Dunsterville could only send telegrams concerning
operations and policy through the G.O.C., Mesopotamia. The Chair
man said that this showed that Dunsterville still retained all his
hopes of doing great things, but he now realised that he was not to
get any troops. General Marshall was, he thought, taking quite the
right line.
General Macdonogh said we never intended to destroy the oil
fields on the Roumanian scale ; it was only a question of destroying
the pipe-lines and the million and a half tons of oil in the reservoirs.
The telegram which the Chairman had just read out was a reply to
the War Office message of the 13th June, asking for a report on the
destruction of the reservoirs. He had received information from a
most reliable source to the effect that the Bolsheviks, even though
they would not defend Baku, might set fire to the wells and pipe
lines as the Turks advanced. He did not think that there would
be any necessity to compensate the owners, as it would be war
damage. The same informant reported that the Tartars were said
to be joining the Turks in order to loot Baku. As regards the
thirty-three guns at Baku, only six were said to be efficient. The
latest report from McDonnell, dated the 15th June, was not at all
optimistic.
General Smuts remarked that McDonnell one day stated that
he controlled the fleet, and the next that he could not even get to
Enzeli. He agreed with General Macdonogh that it would not be
necessary to compensate, as the destruction would be ordinary war
damage. The position, however, was so frequently changingthat he
thought we had better await the report of the officer with
Bicharakoff before issuing definite instructions.
{At this point Mr. Montagu was called away from the meeting.)
General Macdonogh agreed that nothing further could be done
at present. The necessary instructions had been issued to General
Marshall; we had refused to send troops to Baku; we allowed
Dunsterville to send an officer or officers with Bicharakoff, and we
had better now await the report of the officer with Bicharakoff.
Mr. Shuckburgh suggested that it might be possible for us to
use submarines in the Caspian.
Lord Hardinge pointed out that the Caspian was far too
shallow for submarine action, as he knew from his own experience.
General Macdonogh said that, in reply to his enquiry as to
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