Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎39r] (77/544)

7
Our Policy in
Persia.
i
'Die Coinmittee decided —
That the discussion of this question should be adjourmed in order
that the views of the C.l .G.S. might be ascertained.
5. Mr. Montagu said that all the subjects which had been
discussed by the Committee that afternoon really hinged on the
policy we proposed to pursue in Persia. If it was intended to
transform Persia into a military area, in his opinion our present
political and military machinery was quite inadequate. The Com
mittee received political advice from Sir C. Marling, Sir P. Sykes,
various consular officers, and the Government of India. These were
often conflicting in their nature. He thought it desirable either
that there should be one political channel of communication, or else
that Persia should be made a main war area, in which case it would
be necessary to send out a Commander-in-Chief to that country with
an adequate force.
The Chairman said that he thought that the question of policy
could not profitably be discussed by the Committee until a new
Persian Government had been established, and it was possible to
enter into relations with it.
Mr. Montagu said that he referred in particular to recent
telegrams from Sir P. Sykes, and also to one from Sir C. Marling,
suggesting inter alia that it might be necessary to disband the South
Persia Rifles.
The Chairman said that this latter telegram was to him quite 3
incomprehensible. As regards the position of Sir P. Sykes, he did
not regard it as one wdiich need cause them too much anxiety.
This, however, was mainly a military question, and he left it to the
military representatives on the Committee to say whether or not his
opinion in this matter was correct.
General Macdonogh said that the War Office agreed with the
view of the Commander-in-Chief, who had stated that it appeared to
him that Sykes did not realise the effect of Soulet’s recent defeat, or
of Soulet’s difficulties in keeping his force together.
Mr. Balfour, in reply to Mr. Montagu, thought that there was
surely no intention of making Persia a main theatre of war ! The
Germans would certainly not worry about Southern Persia so long
as they were free to exploit their projects in Central Asia.
The Chairman said that he believed that what Mr. Montagu
wished to know was whether we were going to embark on consider
able military operations in South Persia. The Committee were, he
knew, anxious to avoid military commitments there.
Mr. Montagu said that it was impossible either to forecast what
minor military operations might lead to or to set a limit to them.
What had happened was that Sir P. Sykes had undertaken military
operations against Soulet, who was said to be unreliable, but who
had, at any rate, made out a fairly plausible case for protesting
against these operations. Soulet said that he would not have foreign
troops operating in his district. ! 'be trouble, of which he had given
due warning, had been caused by the activities of the South Persia
Rifles. Those activities were undoubtedly provocative to tribes
in the south ; then, in order to save the situation, we were asked to
send impossible reinforcements. Our tendency was more and more
to send out little military bands all over Persia, and embarrassing
complications must be the inevitable result We were to-day
between two stools. It was very necessary for us to keep the Turks
and Germans out of Persia, but we were endeavouring to control
Persia without a force adequate for the purpose. In his opinion,
our present indeterminate course courted disaster.
The Committee decided —
To take up at a f uture meeting the question of [our policy in.
Persia.