Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎38v] (76/544)

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Southern Persia:
Sir P. Sykes.
The Committee decided —
(a.) That it was very desirable that, the financial requirements
of Captain Wagstaff’s irregular troops should be met, if
possible;
(b.) That Mr. Keynes, as representing the Treasury, should
inform his Department of the Committee's views, and that
the Committee were anxious that the Treasury should
enquire into the matter and, inform the War Office if
these requirements could be met.
(c.) That the proposed rate of pa.y (12 krans a day) was
approved for the irregulars raised by General Dunster-
ville.
4. The Chairman said that at the last meeting the Committee
decided to recommend that two battalions should go to Bundar
Abbas and not to Bushire. Sykes, on the other hand, contemplating
an immediate but impossible advance, had pleaded that they should
go to Bushire. The Commander-in-Chief in India, who appeared to
have a correct view' of the situation, had decided to send troops to
both places. Our latest information was to the effect that two
battalions with a held ambulance were due to arrive at Bushire on
the 10th and 13th June; and that two squadrons of cavalry, three
companies of Indian infantry, and one section of a mounted battery
were to reach Bundar Abbas later in the month. Sykes wished the
Bundar Abbas force to advance to Saidabad (which was 160 miles
north of Bundar Abbas and 80 miles east of Lake Niriz) to secure
the Kerman province and to protect the stores and supplies there.
It appeared from his telegrams that Sir P. Sykes was in a disturbed
and somewhat irritable frame of mind, perhaps because he felt
his recent actions had laid him open to criticism, and that by way
of defence he was inclined to shift the blame on to the Minister at
Teheran.
Mr. Montagu said that he had received a private telegram from
the Viceroy enquiring as to the effect upon the position of the
Government of India of the arrangement by which Sykes had been
placed under the Commander-in-Chief. Did that mean that he 'was
under the Government of India or under the War Office, and was
he under the Commander-in-Chief in India in his political capacity
or as a military officer ? The Viceroy welcomed the change, but
while he was anxious to avoid raising any constitutional difficulty,
he could not forget what had happened before in Mesopotamia as
recorded in the Report of the Commission, and was anxious to have
the position clearly defined.
The Chairman said that in arriving at the decision regarding
Sykes, the Committee looked upon it as a purely military business;
that is to say, they had decided that for military purposes, Sykes
should be under the Commander-in-Chief in India.
General Macdonogh said that it was not the intention of the
War Office that General Marshall should command either Sykes or
at Shiraz. The control rested in the hands of Sir Charles Monro,
who again would, he thought, be under the War Office.
Mr. Montagu pointed out some of the difficulties which would
arise from this decision. The Commander-in-Chief was a member
of the Viceroy s Council, but apparently Sykes was now responsible
to the Commander-in-Chief, but not to the Indian Government;
on the other hand, Mesopotamia was under the War Office. He
suggested the best thing to do would be to send out a regular British
soldier to conduct operations in South Persia, if the Committee felt
that such operations were necessary.
General Macdonogh said that he hoped that the Committee would
arrive at no decision at that meeting on this question, as he would
like to consult the CJ.G.S. and obtain his views.