Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎20r] (39/190)

[76—102] b 3
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Persians, who state that there would have been no Azerbaijan movement at al
but for the Russians, are hardly more correct than the Russians, who ascribe i
to a spontaneous outburst of democratic feeling. The fact is that the Russians
found a greater disposition to chafe against control from the capital than t e\
would have found in any other province of Persia. . .
10. In the days of the wars between Persia and Turkey the Azerbaijanis
■»*^formed the spearhead of the Persian army, and that not merely because the\
were the nearest province to Turkey. Although speaking a lurki dialect, the
Azerbaijani is separated from the Turk by his Shiah faith. The connexion
with Persia was strengthened in Qajar times by the custom under which the
heir-apparent was always Governor-General of Azerbaijan. This connexion
was severed when Reza Shah came to the throne, and Azerbaijan was perhaps
neglected more than most other provinces during his reign precisely because of
its pro-Qajar past. Then Tabriz showed a keener attachment to the constitutional
movement of 1905-09 than any other part of Persia, and greater courage in
defending it. This disinclination to accept autocratic rule at the centre took
another step towards “ autonomy ” in 1921, when a certain Khiabani turned out
all the military and civil personnel that were not of local origin, and although he
was overthrown, the desire that the pickings of office should remain in the
province will not have disappeared with him. Nor did the Persian Government
make any effort to conciliate local feeling on this point, and to the average
corruption of the Persian officials in Azerbaijan was added, when Soviet forces
entered the country in August 1941, the cowardice and lack of public spirit
which led most of The higher officials to take to their heels, regardless of the
interests of their charges. Even after the occupation the Persian Government
seems to have made no effort to select officials who would do them credit and tend
to keep the population of Azerbaijan attached to the Persian Government and
throne. The first Governor-General appointed, General Muqaddam, was well
known to be an incorrigible thief, the second was a nonentity, who openly sided
with the Soviet Government against his own. It is suggestive that the Soviet
authorities approved heartily of them both and parted with them with regret
and indeed under protest.
11. There is no need to describe in detail the process by which Azerbaijan
became “ autonomous.” That has been well done by Mr. Wall in his despatches
and telegrams from Tabriz, and, in particular, in the admirable summary, in his
^despatch, No. 2 dated the 12th January, 1946, of the events of the last five months
— - ^Ves.of 1945. As a result of elections of the type which Russia has made familiar,
Azerbaijan has secured a Government purely “ democrat ” in character, the
title “ democrat ” having been adopted, it may be assumed, to recall the democrats
of 1905 and to take in the foreign reader, and also to break away, in appearance at
least, from the Tudeh party, which had become discredited throughout Persia by
its open subservience to Russia and suspect to the Kurds by its agrarian policy.
The Azerbaijan Government has repeatedly declared its desire to operate its
autonomy within the framework of the Persian Constitution, but unless the nego
tiations in Moscow pare down the autonomy very considerably, or unless, with
Soviet help, a stronger Government is set up in Tehran than Persians usually
produce, Azerbaijan is not likely to be amenable to control from Tehran, and the
tendency to gravitate more and more towards union with Soviet Azerbaijan will
be very great. North Persian Kurdistan will undoubtedly be protected by Soviet
influence from too close control even from Tabriz, because of its utility as a
corridor to the heart of the Middle and Near East.
How the Problem has been Dealt with.
(a) Withdrawal of Foreign Troops.
12. The effect of the presence of Soviet troops in Persia was obvious and
caused His Majesty’s Government to wish to hasten their departure and the Soviet
Government to resolve to keep them there as long as possible. At the Yalta Con
ference in February 1945 the Soviet representatives refused to discuss Mr. Eden’s
proposal that the period of withdrawal might begin when the Persian supply route
had been closed, though they confirmed that they had no intention of putting
pressure on Persia and that they stood entirely by the Tripartite Treaty and the
Tehran Declaration. It would have been a weapon against the Soviet Government
if we had been able to accept in principle the thesis put forward by the Persian
Government on the 19th May, that, the war with Germany being over, there was
no longer any need for the retention of Allied troops in Persia. Unfortunately