Coll 28/103 ‘Persia. Perso Russian Relations’ [‎19v] (38/190)

4
troops for Mahabad might be sent from Rezaieh, and lat-er actually urged the
Persian Government to send troops to occupy Mahabad—but from Tabriz, it
would appear that the aim was not only to prevent the introduction of remiorce-
ments in Azerbaijan, but to split up the larger of the existing garrisons so that
the scattered forces might be the more easily overcome. The political develop
ments in Azerbaijan have conformed so closely to the invariable Soviet pattern
that this alone affords strong presumptive evidence of Soviet inspiration, but^^
there is plenty of more direct evidence of Soviet interference : the acting British
Consul-General at Tabriz has himself seen Soviet lorries full of armed “ Demo
crats” driven by Red army soldiers in uniform, and any serious enquiry on
the spot would undoubtedly be able to confirm his conviction that the Soviet
military authorities distributed arms to the dissidents and interfered in other
ways, and that among the “ Democrats ” are many helpers from over the border.
The evidence for the distribution of arms by the Russians is good. Arms have
been given both to the “ Democrats ” and the Kurds, and always Persian arms.
The Soviet Government acquired large stocks of Persian Brno rifles from three
sources: (1) by capture when the Persian army disintegrated in August 1941 :
the Persian Government admit that they lost about 80,000 rifles, and a consider
able proportion of these must have fallen into the hands of the Russians; (2)
by purchase of 100,000, with cartridges, from the Persian Government (with
British money) in 1941; (3) under the contract by which an unwilling Persian
Government was compelled to make rifles and machine pistols and small arms
ammunition for the Soviet Government at prices below cost; about 40,000 rifles
were delivered under this contract. Two rifles seen in “ Democrat ” hands by
the acting British Consul-General at Tabriz are stated by the Persian General
Staff, on the strength of their serial numbers, to belong to the 100,000 which we
bought for the Russians from the Persian Government.
7. Soviet intervention can be studied profitably in connexion with
Kurdistan. Here, again, the Soviet Government have denied the charge, officially
and in writing, but the record convicts them. Perhaps we need not judge too
seriously the much-advertised cultural visit of the Kurdish chiefs to Baku early
in 1942. On the face of it, this was an encouragement to a notoriously recalcitrant
minority and hardly in accordance with the terms of the treaty with Persia and
Great Britain which the Soviet Government had just signed; but let us admit
that the Red army was so weak in Kurdistan that the visit was a device to keep
the Kurds quiet without force or threat of force. Let us admit, too, that after
what seemed to be a period of encouragement the Soviet authorities seemed to be
keeping the Kurds at arm’s length. Later, however, we find them preventing
the Persian authorities from repelling an attack on Rezaieh by local Kurds and
from punishing those responsible for the raid, and protecting the Kurdish
murderer of a Persian registrar who had tried to prevent the rigging of the
Mahabad elections in favour of the Kurdish leader, QazI Muhammad. Open
and unashamed support of Kurdish intransigence came in March 1945, when
there occurred the Mahabad affair described in the preceding paragraph. The
climax came in September 1945, when a group of Kurdish chiefs, headed by the
leaders of the autonomy movement, Qazi Muhammad, were hurried off by the
Soviet military authorities to Baku, where they had an interview with the
President of Soviet Azerbaijan, Baqirov, who promised them Soviet help in
securing their independence if they would assist the new Democratic party of
Azerbaijan. Assistance was speedily provided in the form of a printing press
and a large quantity of paper. There was no concealment about this : assistance
in the form of arms was provided with greater discretion.
8. The Kurdish question, though it has been run by the Russians in
connexion with the Azerbaijan question in general, is not an integral part of it.
It is now clear that the Kurds do not accept orders from the Azerbaijan National
Government in Tabriz, and there is no doubt that in asserting their independence
of Tabriz they are relying on promises of Soviet help. Russian influence in
Tabriz may leaven the whole of Persia; but Russian influence in the northern
part of Persian Kurdistan may leaven not only the southern part of Persian
Kurdistan, but the Kurdish territories of Iraq and Turkey, too. A policy that
united all the Kurds would appeal to the Kurds, and it would suit Russia
because it would weaken three States, bring Soviet influence close to Bagdad and
Mosul, and eventually provide an excuse for demanding the Kirkuk oil to provide
a revenue for an autonomous republic or province of Kurdistan.
9. The very nature of the Azerbaijan movement would have declared its
Soviet origin, even if the Soviet Government had not proclaimed its support
when it held back the Persian reinforcements at Sharifabad. Nevertheless