Coll 28/97(1) ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries.’ [‎337r] (673/807)

British Interests.
20. Lrom the military aspect the situation in Persia is not satisfactory.
There is as yet only a very small number who would be at all likely to support the
British cause if the Germans were to reach Persia, whereas it may be anticipated
|that the Germans would find considerable active support. There are many who
.■iieve in the value of co-operation with the Germans, while there are few who
are convinced of the value of co-operation with the British. There is disappoint
ment that conditions have not improved, that the tyranny of the Shah has merely
been replaced by the inefficiency of a constitutional Government, that abuses
still continue, that food is scarce and expensive. The treaty is universally
unpopular and will only be accepted because of the threat of force in the back
ground and of starvation, because Great Britain controls the supply of wheat.
Persia is in no sense a willing or enthusiastic ally, and is inveterately hostile to
Russia. To secure some useful measure of Persian support in the event of the
Germans reaching Persia, a much more striking argument of the benefits that
will result from co-operation with the British than has yet been evident must be
advanced. Alternatively, Persian sentiment can be ignored and a much greater
degree of control imposed.
Russian Affairs.
^ 21 . M. Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador-designate to the United States, arrived
in Tehran from Moscow on the 17th November and left a few days later for
Bagdad on his way to Washington.
22 . The Soviet Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, has
demanded that all arms in possession of the Persian Government surplus to those
required for the preservation of internal security (the treaty guarantees Persia
against external aggression) should be handed over to the Soviet military forces.
It had, in any case, been decided by His Majesty’s Government that surplus arms
of modern military value should be purchased, whether their destination should
be British or Soviet forces. The Soviet Ambassador and Military Attache have
obviously had orders to stress the urgent need Russia has of these arms.
23. It is reliably reported from Azerbaijan that Russian officers frequently
complain in public of the lack of effective help given to them by the British.
24. Some speculation has been aroused by Russian dealings with tribal
chiefs in Azerbaijan. Certain Kurdish chiefs from Sanjbulaqh, Ushnu and the
Turkish frontier, leaders of the Shahsevan tribes and notables of the Maku area
have been entertained in Tabriz by Soviet authorities. On the 27th November
His Majesty’s Consul at Tabriz reported that twenty Kurdish chiefs had been
‘ rounded up,” brought to Tabriz as respected guests and sent to Baku for a
“ pleasure trip.” It is surmised that the object of these courtesies mav be to
counteract Turkish propaganda and intrigues.
Russian Troops.
25. There is no doubt that there has been a considerable reduction in the
number of Russian troops in Persia and an even greater reduction in tanks,
aeroplanes and guns. Tanks and armoured cars have been shipped from Pahlevi!
Many more loaded lorries go towards Russia than come from Russia.
26. A report, said to emanate from an authoritative Russian Staff officer,
puts the total number of Russian troops at 25,000. Garrisons in some towns have
certainly been much reduced. Kazvin has not more than a small detachment;
Pahlevi and Naushahr not more than a battalion each with some administrative
services; Babulsar a regiment of cavalry and a battalion.
27. Observation of aerodromes in the Russian-occupied zone during the past
fortnight showed that there are now very few Russian aircraft in Persia.
The following were seen at—
Tabriz : 4 machines.
Rezaieh : 3 machines.
Ardabil: 3 machines.
Zinjan : None.
Mianeh : None.
Khoi : None,
Kazvin : None.
Pahlevi : None (aerodrome flooded).