Coll 28/97 ‘Persia. Diaries. Tehran Intelligence Summaries’ [‎75r] (149/749)

^ THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
63 )
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PERSIA. With the Compliments
‘ ~ of the 1
SECRET. Under Secretary of
for Foreign Adairs
[E 1533/110/34]
March 17, 1943.
Section 1.
8 1 MAR 1943 Copy No. 1 J
SECRET
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—{Received March 17.)
(No. 63. Secret.)
HIS Majesty’s representative presents his compliments to His Majesty’s
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit
herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary Xo. 7 for the period the 10th to
16th February, 1943, compiled by the military attache to this legation.
Tehran, Febi'uary 16, 1943.
Enclosure.
Military A ttache's Intelligence Summary No. 7 for the Period February 10-16,
1943.
•(Secret.)
Political.
Persian Affairs.
AFTER a week of discreditable political intrigue Kawam-es-Sultaneh
resigned. In spite of the vote of confidence given to him by the Parliament he
was unable to form a Government. He obtained that vote by means that added
nothing to his credit. In the hope of securing the support of certain Deputies
who aspired to Cabinet rank, he tabled a Bill to abrogate the fundamental law
that no Deputy may become a Minister, and to placate others he announced his
agreement with a Bill tabled by a majority of Deputies to establish Majlis control
over the appointment of the Governor of the National Bank, a proposal to which
Dr. Milspaugh, the American financial adviser, had taken exception. After
obtaining his vote of confidence, Kawam-es-Sultaneh announced that in view of
Dr. Milspaugh’s objection (of which he had been aware all along) he had changed
his mind. He further antagonised the already hostile court by suggesting in a
speech to the Majlis that, in order to strengthen the authority of Parliament
and to establish the sovereignty of the people, changes should be made in the
Constitution. In the end Kawam-es-Sultaneh found himself with practically no
active supporter except the Soviet Ambassador. Considering that he has enjoyed
strong Allied support throughout his tenure of office, and considering his
reputation and experience, the record of his Government has been very
disappointing. The blame for its failure must not be laid entirely on the
shoulders of the Prime Minister. His legitimate intention to establish Cabinet
control over the army brought him into conflict with the Shah and the Chief of
the General Staff, and they and other interested persons made play with the
irresponsible obstructiveness of a venal Majlis to undermine his position. His
Government did, in. fact, fail to take any effective action against hoarders and
ctfvJel h*^Yspeculators, to check rising prices, or to prevent excessive inflation . It is true
j. that it co-operated with the British in the matter of extra issues of currency
and to some extent m tne arrest and detention of suspects, but it leaves to its
0 U) .
successor a critical economic situation, an Administration w T hich has, if anything,
grown more lax and corrupt, and the task of establishing in the provinces the
authority of the Central Government, whose prestige is now lower than ever. It
was well known that he enjoyed Allied support, and his fall may diminish the
moral value of that support to future Governments.
2. His successor is to be his predecessor, Soheily, who was forced to resign
some seven months ago after a short tenure of office during which he established
an impressive record of ineptitude and corruption. He has again been selected
by the Majlis by a considerable majority over other candidates. The Shah, as
was known to the Majlis, wished Said, until lately Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to become Prime Minister. It is considered unlikely that Soheily will be able
to form a stable Government or to check the growing discontent.
[39—64]
IEIdl POL BEPt.
'5 APR H3
INDIA OFFICE The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.