File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎204v] (406/450)

Adviser some unpretentious title, so as to avoid drawing attention to his real functions.
These would be to act as the connecting link between the British Government and the
Sherif, with a free hand to settle all questions of detail as regards the landing of stores
and the like, and also to exercise an undefined though real control over the organisation
of municipal afiairs at Jeddah. In addition to an official with consular experience (to
be called his Assistant), he would require a British officer to assist him and a small
staff of clerks. It would also be as well to send a trustworthy officer of the Egyptian
Army who has had experience as a Mamur in the Sudan.
The alternative is to send a Native Adviser nominated by the Arab party. There
are several obvious advantages in this if a man with suitable qualifications could be
found, but, so far as I am aware, the Arab party has not yet indicated any candidate
who is both experienced in the affairs of Government and at the same time a proved
friend of Great Britain. To send a man of the type of Jamil Eff. Bafel would be
fatal to British and Arab interests. I therefore recommend, in the absence of any
suitable Arab candidate, the immediate appointment of a Senior British Officer. The
Sherif has not yet fully realized his responsibilities at Jeddah and may possibly put
forward an objection. He has, however, always shown himself to be reasonable and can
doubtless be convinced of the importance of establishing an organized svstem of
Government before the beginning of the pilgrim season.
The local Town Council is doing its best but does not know where to begin. There
are two or three indifferent doctors in the town. What is wanted is a trained Moslem
doctor with a gift for organization, and an adequate staff to work in conjunction wfith
the Adviser; otherwise there is grave risk of an epidemic when the pilgrims begin to
arrive. Presumably the International Quarantine Board will now resume its work at
Jeddah.
The Police Force, as a force, does not exist; when the importance of safeguarding
the pilgrims en route to Mecca and Medina is alluded to, the invariable reply is°that the
Arabs will not dare to disobey the Sherif. Their attitude at Babigh and the fact that
they have had three years forced abstinence from raiding makes one sceptical as to their
obedience.
The Arabs leave too much to Allah and must be saved from themselves, since a
disastrous pilgrimage would not only be fatal to the Sherif’s prestige but would affect
the lives of British subjects and harm us in our Mohammedan possessions. Adequate
medical precautions, safe passage in the interior, and cheap food are the three most
essential desiderata to the pilgrims and should be urgently attended to. I should have
liked to have talked to inherit Mohsm about the pilgrimage but he was, unfortunately,
top ill. Public security has been well maintained in Jeddah, the only house to be looted
being that of Sheikh Ahmed Hegazi, the Jeddah Agent of Sherif Haidar Ali.
The presence of a British warship off Jeddah has probably had a restraining influence
on the Arabs.
Cairo, July 8, 1916.
K. CORNWALLIS, Captain,
APPENDIX I.
The fodowing is a summary of the Sheriffs requirements :—
I.—Military.
(a.) For Immediate Action.
1. 7,000 rifles, of which 1,000 are very urgently required at Rabigh.
2. 5,300,000 rounds of S.A.A., of which 1,000,000 are very urgently required at
Rabigh.
3. 50 kilog. of dynamite.
4. 500 hand bombs.
5. Five Trained Moslem Armourers for the repairs of both rifles and guns.
6. Two or three Moslem experts in explosives, about whom Colonel Wilson has
already telegraphed to the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. .
7. 250 tents at Rabigh.