File 705/1916 Pt 2 'Arab revolt: Arab reports; Sir M Sykes' reports' [‎204r] (405/450)

both Jamil and Faroki were no better than Turks, and that the letter was a complete
fabrication. Jamil Effendi made no difficulties about returning to Cairo.
Re-opening of Trade. —In Appendix III will be found the Sherifs request to
re-open the trade of the whole Hejaz coast. I have already telegraphed to you about
raising the blockade as far south as Lith, which the Sherif wishes to use as his port for
provisioning the Azir army. In this connection I would point out that the re-opening
of trade will only mean a return to the conditions of two months ago. To allow the
passage of such things as sugar, petroleum, and other luxuries, it is necessary to cancel
the existing regulation and publish a new one. I recommend this being done in the
case of Jeddah on bn A cone of sugar costs 8s. in Jeddah, and other commodities
are in proportion. It is very necessary that prices should be normal before the influx
of pilgrims.
Turkish Prisoners. —There are about 1,700 men and 60 officers in Jeddah. The
officers live in houses in the town, the men in barracks at the south-east corner of the
town. Faroki asked me to go and see them one afternoon, but afterwards said that it
was inconvenient. Officers’ servants are freely allowed into the town to buy food.
Faroki separated the Arabs from the Turks, and made certain changes in the diet. I
have no reason to believe that the prisoners are not being well treated. The Sherif
evidently intends to keep them as hostages.
Cable. —The cable ship “Cambria” was expectedly shortly at Jeddah. It is not
anticipated that extensive repairs will be necessary. The Sherif does not ^ want the
Eastern Telegraph Company to have to do the working of the cable. He intends to
have his own staff both at Jeddah and Suakin.
Conclusion. —The fort of Jiyad, with its garrison of fifty men and three or four
guns, has fallen, and there remains the larger force of over 800 men defending the
barracks. This force possesses no guns, and is said to be holding out chiefly owing to
the Sherifs desire to avoid bloodshed. The Egyptian batteries will probably force it
to capitulate. Taif is a more difficult problem, but may reasonably be expected
to surrender in course of time. Medina is the danger point. The garrison there is said
to number 7,000 men, and is commanded by an energetic general, Fakhri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. . He
has already made a sortie from the town, and inflicted severe losses on the Arabs, who
altogether do not number more than 9,000. There is always the possibility that he
may try to march south and force an issue with the Sherif. The water and transport
difficulties are immense, but not insuperiable. Our experience at Habegh and Yenbo
showed how slender is the Sherif’s control over the Arabs in the outlying districts.
Another defeat might have serious effect on their morale. The Sherif has no trained
officers of any sort with him—but only tribal sheikhs leading their undisciplined
followers. It is important to send back by H.I.M.S. “ Hardinge ’ an Arab military
mission. They will put new life and confidence into the Arabs. To conquer, or at any
rate contain, the Medina garrison is the most important question at the moment. The
Sherifs dream of an advance on Syria is impossible of realisation for a long time to
come. .
Government in the Hejaz is in a state of chaos. There is no one who has any idea
of organisation. The smallest details are referred to the Sherif by telephone, and he
can have no time to work out a proper scheme of government or see things from a broad,
standpoint. The townspeople of Jeddah think well of him personally, but fear his
Sherifs, and are equally suspicious of any Arabs who may be sent from Cairo to govern
them. The Sherif, in order to conciliate both his own Sherifs and the Arab party in
Cairo, is going to put the former in as Governors, the latter as their Advisers. This
means a double pay-list and, perhaps, a two-fold toll from the merchants. ^ Jeddah is at
present a hotbed of intrigue ; all the chief men are striving to secure a niche for them
selves, and are quite indifferent as to the means employed^ to gain their ends. The
townspeople hate the Arabs, the Arabs return the feelings with interest and are deeply
suspicious of each other. Broadly speaking they are divided into two opposing factions,
the one led by Sherif Mohsin and the other by Abdel Latif El Muzeini, ttm harbour
master. The agent of Sherif Mohsin told me himself that neither he nor his master
dared to eat or drink outside of their own house, and, doubtless, their opponents are
equally careful. _ . -p . . ,
The most satisfactory way of administrating Jeddah would be to appoint a
Adviser to a Hejazi Governor like Sherif Mohsin. _ The Arab party in Cairo who do
not want anything from England except an unlimited supply of gold supplies an
munitions, would cry out that local Moslem opinion would never sanction this; but the
fact that Sherif Mohsin has himself said that he would welcome an English Adviser
shows that their objection is without justice. It would be advisable to give such an.