Coll 17/35 ‘Iraq. Iraq – Saudi Relations. Demarcation of Frontier.’ [‎5r] (9/112)

FIL
With the Compliments
of the
Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affaire •
, iCfkO-
-fL&J, H C-^i.
No. 232• *
(VW.
No.
(E 2411/166/25)
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GN OFFICE, S.W.l.
8th Septemher, 1940. /
din
Sir,
wit’ll
June
of the
506(86/19/40) of the 27th
tlife proposed demarcation
a Joint Commission under an
in your despatch Np^ 527 (86/25/40)
In your despatch
Your Excellency dealt
Saudi-Iraqi frontier n oy
Egyptian President, and
of the 12th July, you enclosed a copy of a note from the
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs enquiring v/hether His
Majesty’s Government would agree that the problem of
fixing the point of intersection of latitude 52° North
with longitude 39° East should be referred to the Egyptian
President of the Commission for a decision "in the light of
’’treaties in force 1-
2. So far as the meeting-point of Saudi, Iraqi and
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan territory is concerned, the question at issue
is not to fix the point of intersection of latitude 32°
North and longitude 39° East, but to find the correct
position of the termination point of the Saudi--Iraqi
frontier. This lies, in the view of His Majesty’s
Government, at the summit of the Jebel Anaza, as has
been explained to the Iraqi Government by Your Excellency,
and to the members of the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi frontier
survey parties by Mr. Le Pay when he met them near the
Jebel Anaza last February. Whatever answer is eventually
given to the Iraqi enquiry, it should be so worded as to
avoid any acceptance of the view that the problem is to
find a particular point of intersection.,
3. So far as the proposed commission is concerned,
His Majesty’s Government have no objection to the Iraqi and
Saudi-Arabian Governments taking any action which they may
think it desirable to take, whether by a commission or
otherwise, to determine the line of their common frontier,
including its two termination-points. Indeed, it would
in one sense be difficult for His Majesty’s Government to
find any valid ground for objection, for even if they were
to disagree with the views of the two parties as to the
correct position of one of the termination-points, they
would have no locus standi for questioning this view unless
they felt that the result deprived them of territory to
which they, or rulers for whom they were responsible, were
rightfully entitled. In other words, provided His Majesty’s
Government felt that Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan or Koweit, as the case might
be, had all the territory to which they thought Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan
or Koweit was entitled, it would not matter to them whether
Iraq had gained territory at the expense of Saudi-Arabia, or
vice versa, provided t^al Sav'di--Arabia or Iraq, as the case
the other hand, they felt
"/that