Coll 17/10(1) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎242v] (489/982)

quarters to Diwaniyah to endeavour to recover the two bodies. With the help of
the mutessarif and a local saiyid he succeeded in despatching a letter to Sheikh
Khawam-al-Abbas, who at once sent in the bodies decently covered in cloth and
reeds. In his letter the sheikh explained that his tribesmen had fired on the
aeroplane because they thought it was attacking them with machine guns. The
Air Officer Commanding assures me that this was impossible, as the guns of the
machine had not been made ready for action when the flight left Hinaidi. The
most probable explanation is that the tribesmen mistook the Boyal Air Force
machines for Iraqi aircraft, many of which have lately been carrying out recon
naissances over the Rumaitha area.
6. On the evening of the 9th May, I visited the Prime Minister, who is
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , He expressed
great regret at the death of the Boyal Air Force officer and gunner and for the
loss of the British aeroplane. He agreed with the view that the tribesmen had
fired on the Boyal Air Force machines because they mistook them for an Iraqi
reconnaissance.' At my suggestion he undertook to publish a communique, making
it clear that the flight'of British aircraft was unconnected with the operations to
restore order, which were being undertaken by the Government. I enclose herein
a copy of the communique which appeared in the press on the 10th May.^)
7. So soon as Bumaitha was attacked, the Minister of the Interior went to
Diwaniyah in order to study the situation, and to make a last effort to arrange a
peaceful settlement. On the afternoon of the 9th May, handbills were scattered
over the area from Iraqi aeroplanes, warning the tribes that, unless they dispersed
to their homes within twenty-four hours and resumed their normal lives, the
Government would be forced to take punitive action against them.
8. The tribes made no response, and on the morning of the 11th May, after
warnings had been dropped that women and children should be removed from the
villages, aerial bombing began and has been continued daily. Simultaneously
arrangements were made for the concentration at Diwaniyah of 5 infantry
battalions, 1 field battery, 1 mountain battery and 1 company of motor machine
guns with auxiliary troops. Three companies of an infantry battalion were also
sent from Basra to Samawah, and thence occupied the important railway bridges
at Barbuti and Imam Abdullah. General Bakr Sidqi Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. was put in command
of all troops between Hillah and Basra, and martial law was proclaimed in the
Rumaitha nahiyah. On the morning of the 12th May, a column comprising the
bulk of the troops concentrated at Diwaniyah began a movement southwards
towards Rumaitha.
9. The situation on the morning of the 13th May was promising. The
moral effect of the air action taken by the Iraqi air force was reported to have
been good. Tribal gatherings were dispersing, a number of sheikhs of the
Rumaitha area had made their submission and the nephew of Khawam-al-Abbas
had made overtures for terms for his uncle. The Prime Minister told me that
he was hopeful that the troops would be able to reoccupy the district without
serious fighting. Later in the day, however, there was a change for the worse.
Telegrams from Nasiriyah reported that the restlessness of the Muntafiq tribes
was at last turning into open revolt. The tribes in the neighbourhood of
Suq-al-Shiyukh had risen and were attacking the local serais in Suq-al-Shiyukh,
Akaika and Qarmah Bani Said. The Mutessarif of Nasiriyah was asking for
troops to be despatched urgently to his help.
10. On the 14th May it was reported that the rebels had captured Akaika,
and the mutessarif, fearing an attack on Nasiriyah itself, asked urgently for
ammunition and reinforcements. A battalion of infantry was sent off from
Bagdad in motor cars to try to get through to Nasiriyah via Kut and the Hai,
and the Iraqi air force were called upon to take down supplies of ammunition.
Unfortunately, all their aircraft were bogged in the waterlogged aerodrome at
Diwaniyah, or already engaged either in bombing raids on the Rumaitha front
or in transporting ammunition to the beleaguered police at Suq-al-Shiyukh.
Fearing that Nasiriyah might be attacked that night, the Prime Minister made
a personal appeal to me to help him by sending ammunition to Nasiriyah in a
Royal Air Force Victoria. For the reasons which I have already explained in
my telegram No. 141 of the 14th May, I did not feel able to consent to ask the
Air Officer Commanding to comply with the Prime Minister’s request.
U Not printed.