Coll 17/10(1) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎27v] (59/982)

i -■ -i• if he were given time, he would be
assured me that he hoped and be leve ’ rt t0 i ts normal functions, and
successful in his efforts to make the army^ would nQt remain in office !
he again said that, if he nd he said, with obvious sincerity, that he
then spoke of the murder of Jafar, ^ d ’ lored the dropping of bombs in
was as shocked and as grieved as ■ ,, sev ^ ral innocent people. I went on
Bagdad, which had resulted in t 3 7 , im ] ia( .| | 1( , el) to satisfy myself that
to explain that the mam object o . ji ves G f members of the ex-Cabinet.
he was taking adequate measures to protect the l lves ib]e He said that he
He begged me to believe that he ^ , d f ^^“Irantee of their safety, hut
would have liked to have been able to g^e meagua^ ^ ^ Beki S j dq ., s
that he regretted he could no , agreed "rliiit the best course would be
force. He had thought, and 1 a SV a r P ossible. He had been in
to get them quietly out of t e cou y .|' f Yasin had given him some
touch with Yasm and R ashid Ain The atotude ot ° hig house and
moments of anxiety because that morning Y amn nan F but he
had received visits from representatives of some^ot had consented
had Hikmat | as therefore making arrange-
to go and to take Ras . , Every precaution would be taken
ments for them to leave Bagdad tnat mgni. nvc y ! however been
for their safety which he thought he could promise. He had not, nowevei oeen
able to get into contact with Nuri, and he was somewhat concerned about this.
It had occurred to him that it might be possible that I could do so (he dear y
knew that Nuri was in the Embassy, but was too good-mannered to show it). If
by 6 anv bhancl I 'were able to do so, it would be a help to him if I could advise
Nuri 'also to leave Iraq and could make arrangements for his departure
12 I spent most of the rest of the day with Nun, who was m a distressing
state of nervousness, hut so soon as plans were concluded with the Air Officer
Commanding for his departure by aeroplane to Egypt, he recovered his spirits
and he began to talk freely, if still a little wildly, about the crisis. I shall not
weary you with an account of what he said, except to tell you that he was
insistent in the expression of the belief that King Ghazi was privy to Bekr
Sidqi’s movement, and that he said that this was also the conviction ot Yasm.
I had watched King Ghazi very closely while he, with his Ministers, was
discussing the affair on the morning of the day before, and I am bound to say
that I, too, gained the impression that it came as no surprise to His Majesty.
13. Shortly before midnight, Nnri was conveyed, with his family, quietly
to Hinaidi, whence he left for Egypt before dawn on the 31st October. I was
glad to hear about 10 o’clock of his arrival at Amman, and it was with^great
relief that I learned early in the afternoon of the safe passage over the Syrian
frontier of Yasin and Rashid Ali. That day I saw King Ghazi again and I
found His Majesty almost cock-a-hoop. He readily acquiesced in my suggestion
that suitable provision should be made for Jafar’s widow and that she should
be sent to join her children, who were at school in Egypt.
14. A copy of Bekr Sidqi’s manifesto is enclosed herein.
15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty’s High
Commissioner at Jerusalem and to His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran.
I have, &c.
ARCHIBALD CLARK KERR,
Enclosure.
Extract from the Iraq Times, October 30, 1936.
“ To the Noble Iraqi Nation,
THE army, which is composed of your sons, has lost patience with the
present Government, who have been concerned only with their own personal
interests, disregarding the public welfare. The army has therefore appealed to
His Majesty the King to dismiss the present Cabinet, and to replace it by another
composed of sincere citizens under the leadership of Sayid Hikmat Sulaiman,
who is held in the greatest esteem and respect by the public.