Coll 17/10(1) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎27r] (58/982)

this information from one Ahmed-al-Manassifi, the secretary to the Ministry of
Defence, whom he had now brought with him to the Embassy. In his turn Ahmed
had had it from Bekr feidqi and his officers. But there was more than this. It
was the intention of a group of these officers that night to murder Yasin,
Rashid Ali and Nuri himself. Nuri had been able to warn Yasin, who was now
in hiding in the town, but he had not been able to get into touch with Rashid Ali
He asked whether he himself might sleep the night at the Embassy. He had
evidently come prepared to do so, because he had brought a small piece of luggage
with him. I clearly could not refuse this request, but I save to it that Ahmed-al-
Manassifi got out of the house as discreetly and as quickly as possible. He had
obviously come unwillingly, and he wanted no speeding. ^ It needed some little
play-acting to be able to deal with Nuri and my dinner-party at the same time,
but I understand that none of my guests appreciated that anything very unusual
was afoot. ^ o ^
9. It seemed to me that no time should be lost in getting into touch with the
new Piime Minister, in acquainting him with the plot and in using such influence
a r ^ ^ ht ^ ave P reven t its being put into effect. For this purpose I asked
Mi. Edmonds to come at once to the Embassy, and I explained the situation to
him. At my request he went immediately to Hikmat’s house with a message from
me to the effect that murders such as I understood now to be planned, comin»’ on
top of the shooting of Jafar-al-Askari, which I should be obliged to report to you
would create so deplorable an impression in London that I could not foresee the
consequences. The first would probably be the rupture of relations with His
Majesty s Government. At the same time I urged the Prime Minister to take
instant measures to protect the lives of the three men concerned. It was about
1 ° clock when Mr. Edmonds returned, with an emphatic assurance from Hikmat
at he would not allow any of the late Ministers to be harmed, and that he was
taking the precaution of posting police guards on their houses. At the same time
he expressed appropriate horror at the murder of Jafar, adding, however that
he was m np way responsible for it, as it had taken place before he had accepted
ofhee. Ihe fault lay with the King for his thoughtlessness in allowing Jafar to
go to meet the army m its present temper.
10 Meanwhile I had sent Nuri to bed, for he was on the verge of a collapse
but, before doing so, I staged a little scene designed to suggest to the sentrv who
wVlffh him arrive that Nun was leaving by the same way as he had come", and.
h® the sentry s attention was re-engaged, Nuri got quickly back into the house
SurfeoVminT ^ f ° r b ° ySbut * was ^ ™ tune
froid Mr k a d!LnY he r 0rning 0 f .9 e followin g da y. the 30th, I received a visit
trom Mr Edmonds, who came with a message from the Prime Minister which
“f h T S h aSSUranCeS f f yT dlineSS and Ms WIsh that 1 should co-operate
Rashid Ali kfJA enCy o f vf atlS j yl .v g myse ! f beyond doubt that Yasin, Nuri and
to receivt me h an!l d T b P ut , be y ond , th e. reach of danger prompted me to ask him
him for aC.’A k Called T 11 hlm m Jhe course of the morning. I was with
fo^ndTAff ° h u U fd 1 we ?t t0 h ,m , I confess, full of prejudice, and I
friendto rndLT eWha .° my d i S T y ’ dlsarmed by his obvious desire to be
fo mv sirnlJ ‘he earnestness and the apparent sincerity with which he begged
tor my support. The assurances which he gave me of his belief in the neceisity
of to f r e ? dly relations between His Majesty’s Government and Iraq and
of his desire to have help and guidance from myself left, on the face of them
nothing to be desired^ He forestalled the observations which ] was about to
make concerning the folly and the dangers of the way in which he had come
into office by saying that he himself could see what was in my mind There was
no one who regretted these circumstances more than himself, or who appreciated
more than he did the dangers inherent in the part played by the army, but he
could promise me that his first preoccupation would he to put the army back
into its proper place. He would not remain a day in office if he failed to do
t to ^ was , n g> however, deterred from saying what I had meant to say, and
I said it with all frankness, and added that the whole circumstances of his coming
into office would be bound to make the worst possible impression in London I
said that His Majesty’s Government could hardly fail to assume that what, in
tact, had been set up m Iraq was a military dictatorship, and that I should
welcome any sign that he could give me to show this was not so. He ao-ain
[856 q—I] ,, 9 n