Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎328r] (656/1144)

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interfere over much with their aims or reflecting too closely upon the precise
composition of that community For instance, the Sunni element, to which
allusion has already been made, is actually outnumbered in Iraq by the Shiah
Arabs and the Kurds, although it is politically predominant. Moreover, Arab
brotherhood is soon forgotten whenever the Iraqi Government, for example,
employ a Syrian or a Palestinian or an Egyptian for a post which an Iraqi thinks
he himself could fill. Again, there is a genuine national sentiment at least in
Egypt and, of recent years, in Iraq. In the other Arab countries national feeling
in the wider sense can hardly exist. An Arab from Damascus, or the Hejaz, or
the Hadramaut may and probably does have a fellow-feeling for those of the
same local origin as himself, and a feeling of loyalty'—if he is a tribesman—for
his tribal chief. But it is unlikely that his emotions are profoundly stirred by
the Republic of Syria, or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or the Sultanate of
Shi hr and Mukalla.
11. Finally, whatever the wishes of the Arabs may be (and notwithstanding
the tact that a single large State or federation might, as already suggested, be
better able to stand on its own feet than a number of small ones), the difficulties
inherent in administering such a large, sparsely populated and backward country,
in which Iraqis, for instance, will still look on Syrians as effete and Syrians still
look on Iraqis as boors, make it most unlikely that even a single Arab State or
union of Arab States could, at any rate for a long time to come, dispense with
friendly help and support from outside. In fact, the best advice which
sympathisers with pan-Arabism can give to its supporters is that each Arab State
should first learn how to become strong and prosperous, so that it can bring
strength and prosperity to the eventual federation, instead of weakness and
poverty.
12. The French attitude towards Arab federation and a fortiori towards
any closer form of union has been expressed emphatically and categorically on
many occasions.(’) The French Government are definitely and implacably opposed
to it as something which may weaken their position in Syria and even in the
Lebanon. They maintain that it is in the interest of both Great Britain and
France to stabilise as soon as possible the existing situation in the Arab world.
Why the French Government attach so much importance to their position in the
Middle East is not always easy to understand. The retention of Syria and the
Lebanon under mandate cannot be of any particular advantage economically,
except in so far as it provides employment for a number of French officials!
Although use is often made of the argument that it is cheaper to maintain troops
in the mandated territories than in France, the defence of territories so remote
from other French territories must on the whole be an anxiety and a commitment
rather than a source of strength. The reason is, no doubt, partly to be found in
the historic cultural connexion of I ranee with the Levant A geographical area corresponding to the region around the eastern Mediterranean Sea. and in memories of
the French role of protector of the Christians in the East: in fact, a matter of
pride and prestige, rather than of solid benefit.
13. Jealousy of Great Britain also plays its part in deciding the French
attitude. Since the area in the Middle ' East where British influence is
predominant is much larger than the area under French control, and since, more
over, His Majesty's Government have always been regarded as more sympathetic
than the French Government to Arab aspirations, it is assumed in France that
French influence in a united Arab State or federation would be much less
powerful than British influence. Any sympathy shown by His Majesty’s
Government for pan-Arab aspirations is consequently not regarded as being
wholly disinterested, and, in so far as it is considered to be a subtle attempt on
the part of His Majesty’s Government to rob France of her share in the spoils
of the last war, it causes considerable resentment.
14. In any case, the France of to-day is determined to maintain an effective
hold upon Syria and the Lebanon, whatever their precise status may be, and. if
there is one part of the world more than another where French Governments and
officials have in the past been suspicious and resentful of British rivalrv and
where even to-day His Majesty’s Government must pay more than ordinary regard
to French susceptibilities, it is here.
15. There is not much that can be said about the position of Turkey The
Turkish Government have repeatedly declared that they harbour no territorial
(’) See annex for some examples.
B 2
[705 ee—3]