Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎156r] (312/1144)

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consideration of the Palestine question in 1939 was the first occasion on whic 1
Arab States were recognised by His Majesty’s Government as being mu ua y
interested in the settlement of the Palestine problem. 1 he conference me m u
delegates representing Egypt, Saudi Arabia. Yemen, Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan and Iraq, w o
were invited because their States were interested in the future of I a lest me, i
being an Arab territory and its administration and future development a nia er
of common concern to all Arabs. . . .
- In Arab eyes this invitation marked a return by Great Britain to the spin
of her old pledges to King Husain which regarded all Arabs in the old Ottoman
Empire as one community united by one ideal. This is my first justification loi
raising these issues and making my suggestions at this time.
It has to be admitted that conditions in all these Arab countries have
remained unsettled ever since the end of the last Great War. Numerous
rebellions have broken out causing much bloodshed and devastation in many pai ts
of these Arab lands. Apart from this, the most law-abiding inhabitants of those
countries have always been the victims of worry and anxiety about their own
future and that of their compatriots during all these long years. In Palestine
and Syria even the non-rebellious Arabs feel that they have not been allowed to
develop their full civil and political rights. They have had no confidence m the
ability of the mandatory regime to provide a permanent peaceful form of govern
ment. They have had to live in territory too often subject to disorder to enable
them to consider the future and prepare for it.
As soon as the present war broke out the Axis Powers did not lose a moment
in looking for weak points m the Allied position in the Arab countries and
promptly exploited any weaknesses they were able tc discover. Elements of
disorder and anarchy in all Arab countries were actively and unscrupulously
supported, with the result that both the Arabs and the United Nations suffered
severely.
In spite of previous disillusionments the Arabs have welcomed the Atlantic
Charter with satisfaction, because they consider it a guarantee for the realisation
of their national aspirations which will be united in the way they choose of their
own free will.
We feel that the British Government regards the Arabs’ claims with
sympathy and that they are ready to solve the problem of the Arab countries in
the same satisfactory manner as they solved those of Iraq. If they succeed in
putting these sympathetic intentions into effect, the present chaotic state of the
Arab countries will come to an end to the benefit of the interests of Great Britain
as well as to the Arab countries themselves.
We realise that the British Government has not a free hand in dealing with
these problems, because their action is subject to the concurrence of their Allies.
But now that the United States are co-operating so fully with Great Britain
the hands of the latter are freer and we feel that it will be possible for her to
reconsider her whole policy towards all Arabs.
All Arabs and particularly those of the Near and Middle East have, deep
down in their hearts, the feeling that they are “ members one of another ” Their
“ nationalism” springs from the Moslem feeling of brotherhood enjoined on
them by the Prophet Muhammad in his last public speech. It differs therefore
from a great deal of European nationalism and patriotism. Although Arabs are
naturallv attached to their native land, their nationalism is not confined by
boundaries. It is an aspiration to restore the great tolerant civilisation of the
early Caliphate.
We therefore believe that any policy which satisfies the legitimate political
rights and aspirations of the Arabs will restore peace to the Arab countries and
that such peace and contentment will be of invaluable service in promoting the
interests of the United Nations in this grave period of war. Moreover, such a
policy will put an end to the Axis intrigues in the Arab countries and stop the
flood of Axis propaganda which finds there a most fertile soil for sowing its
evil seeds, owing to the discontent of the Arabs with their present situation and
their anxiety about their future.
The events of the past few years have revealed the weakness of very small
States. It is generally assumed that after the war the peace settlement will
endeavour to group the smaller States together in some form of regional leagues
or alliances which can be sufficiently powerful to protect all the members from
aggression. While I realise that many years must elapse before the Arab States
can stand completely alone, yet. even their allies among the Great Powers will
probably demand that they make a greater contribution to their own defence
services. Therefore the old idea of creating an independent Palestine and an
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