Coll 6/43 'Pan Arab Congress 1933. Attitude of H.M.G. to a Pan Arab Movement' [‎155v] (311/1144)

So for many years she made no serious effort to carry out the duty imposed
upon her of assisting the inhabitants of Palestine to advance towards self-
government. Unfortunately, when she eventually did consider how best to execute
this part of her task, Arab fears of ultimate Jewish dominance and hostility to
the mandate had become so intense that it was impossible to secure their co-opera
tion in any proposed legislative or other assembly which might have paved the
way for self-government.
In 1937 Mr. Ormsby-Gore, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the
Permanent Mandates Commission in the clearest possible terms “ that, in the
absence of a radical change in the political relations, it would not he possible to
carry on (the government of Palestine) except by methods of continuous military
repression. The fact was that in Palestine the vast majority of the population
was hostile to the mandatory Power and to the mandate. The loyalty of the
Arabs was not directed towards Great Britain, the mandatory Power, but to the
Arab race and the Arab ideal.” At this meeting the Secretary of State
reiterated this view: “The mandatory told the Mandates Commission—as it
would tell the Council later—that they were convinced of the necessity of
political changes ” ; and again : “It was his definite opinion that, once the Arabs
of Palestine (fired as they were with political hostility both to the mandatory
Power and to the Jews) were given self-government, it would be to their interest
to maintain security . . .
As a result His Majesty’s Government recommended the partition of
Palestine into three States—a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British-
mandated area.
Upon careful examination by a special Boundary Commission the partition
of Palestine into separate States was found to be impractical. But this
commission did not examine the possibility of creating a Jewish enclave An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. or
enclaves An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. , with special rights on the Maronite model, inside a Palestinian State
or a greater Arab State which would include Syria and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan . The
creating of two or more completely independent States out of the small territories
of Palestine would have involved the creation of complex artificial boundaries
with numerous pockets of Jews in the Arab State and vice versa, it would have
meant the creation of at least one international corridor and possibly more. But
if all Palestine were included in one Syrian State, the boundaries of the Jewish
enclaves An area of land belonging to one country and entirely surrounded by land of just one other country. would he administrative boundaries only. The Jewish areas might
consist of a number of qadhas or even nahiyas in which the Jews would enjoy
special rights : alternatively, by arrangement with all parties a definite
consolidated area could be assigned to the Jews for semi-autonomous administra
tion, and Arabs settled within it would have to accept to live under the special
regime or could be found land elsewhere.
However, the partition of Palestine into two independent States and a
mandated area, which had pleased nobody, was declared impossible, and the final
policy of Great Britain was made public in 1939 after the Palestine Conference
had broken down.
In the latest White Paper of 1939 His Majesty’s Government declared that—
“ (1) The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the establishment within
ten years of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with
Great Britain ....
“(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share
in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests
of each community are safeguarded.”
The White Paper of 1939, in effect, limited the Jewish National Home in
Palestine to the Jewish communities then resident in Palestine, plus 75,000 Jews
who were to be allowed to settle in Palestine during the five years 1939-44. This
meant that the Jews in Palestine would in 1944 constitute about a third of the
population and that they would remain a permanent minority. His Majesty’s
Government therefore considered that by 1944 her pledge in the Balfour
Declaration would have been fulfilled and a Jewish National Home established
in Palestine. All that remained was to establish self-government in Palestine in
such a way as would best safeguard the rights of the Jews who had settled in
Palestine under the terms of the Balfour Declaration. The detailed proposals
put forward by His Majesty’s Government to reach this objective do not affect
the underlying basis of the statement of policy : that Palestine had to be given
self-government as soon as possible and that the Jews should be a permanent
minority in this new State. The conference which met in London for the