Coll 6/91 'Saudi Arabia. Policy of H.M.G. Qn. of credits and guarantee of assistance to Ibn Saud.' [‎339r] (678/680)

once (so the King said), and then only to be told the latest decision of His
Majesty’s Government about the Mufti and the Palestine situation, and to be
dismissed back to Bagdad; and when, just after Jamal’s departure, Ibn Sand
learned through me that Jamal was considered by the High Commissioner of
Palestine to have invented and spread abroad unfounded tales of ill-treatment of
returning Palestinian refugees by the Palestine authorities, he telegraphed to his
representative in Bagdad in very strong terms, to urge Jamal and the Mufti not
to engage in any propaganda or other activities against Great Britain, as that
would be ruinous to the Arab world.
7. It was after this that Ibn Saud went over with me the history of his
efforts in connexion with Palestine during the last year. He claimed that if.
some little while after the issue of the white paper, hostilities in Palestine died
down, it was partly owing to his efforts, and he instructed Sheikh Yusuf Yasin
to show me the correspondence. Sheikh Yusuf produced a sheaf of corres
pondence, direct and indirect, between the King and the Syrian and Palestinian
leaders. It began with a letter to the Saudi Consul in Damascus, through whom,
together with Bashif-al-Sadawi, Ibn Saud was in touch with the leaders. This
letter was rather on the lines of the letter from Ibn Saud to Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , which
the latter showed, perhaps in a mutilated form, to many Arabs, in an effort, it
would seem, to discredit Ibn Saud as anti-Arab. It advised the Arab leaders
to become reconciled to Great Britain and France, lest the British and French
Governments should grow tired of unceasing opposition and join with the Turks
and the Jews against the Arabs; and suggested that if only the question of
Palestine could be settled, a solution of the Syrian problem would follow. I was
shown individual replies from Jamil Mardom and Shukri Quwatli and a joint
letter signed by them and five others. Shukri served as go-between with the
Mufti. It is not necessary to take at their face value the protestations in these
letters, promising to be guided by the King’s advice, but the correspondence did
show what efforts the King was making in the interests of peace in Palestine—
not, he was as anxious as ever to explain, to give pleasure to His Majesty’s
Government, but because he felt it essential in the interests of all Arabs. His
interest in Syria was doubtless prompted in part by his desire to obtain French
support for the Amir Faisal as a candidate for the Syrian Throne.
8. Ibn Saud showed no sigji of wanting anything from His Majesty’s
Government in these days. He is not of the blackmailing type, and he would
probably admit that the defeat of Germany, whom he regards as a danger to
Islam and to the East in general, will be a reward in itself for his benevolent
neutrality. He seemed grateful for such action as we have been able to take
to temper the wind of war to his country. His immediate preoccupation in
these days is the pilgrimage, which, as a result of war conditions, is likely
to be a small one and so to affect his budget and to arouse discontent in the
Hejaz. I was able to give him some consolation by reporting that the resumption
of sailings of Indian pilgrim ships was being actively considered, and by
reminding him of the very helpful attitude of the Government of India on the
matter of the export of food-stuffs to Saudi Arabia. I also told him that we
were appealing to Egypt to allow the export of certain machinery parts required
by the gold mine at Mahd. and to Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan in connexion "with his desire
to import food-stuffs from there in spite of the general prohibition of export.
But what Ibn Saud valued most was the statement in which His Majesty’s
Government say that they know of no ground on which the Amir Abdullah
could possibly suppose that he is likely to be chosen for the Throne of Syria
by the French. His cheerfulness after this statement lends support to his
contention that he doesn't want Syria himself, but doesn't want to see a Hashimite
there.
9. The proposal that Captain de Gaury, until recently political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at
Koweit, should go to Riyadh as a representative of His Majesty’s Legation,
threw Ibn Saud into a panic when first broached some weeks ago, but was
eventually accepted with manifest pleasure. Having got used, during my visit,
to having someone at hand to talk to, the King did not like the idea of my ,
leaving, but he was easily persuaded to accept Captain de Gaury as a substitute. /
To fill an interval of several weeks I left behind Mr. Wall, who knows Arabic
exceedingly well, to serve as liaison officer, and Ibn Saud seemed much pleased
with this arrangement. He waved aside the suggestion that other Powers might