Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎155v] (310/320)

40
Enclosure to Serial No. (33).
Despatch from British Legation, Tehran, to Ministry of Information,
No. 22|(218|14|40), dated the 18 th October 1940.
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report by the Press
Attache on the internal situation, in continuation of the report which was en
closed in my despatch No. 21 of the 7th September, 1940 [Serial No. (32)].
2. A copy of this despatch and enclosure is being forwarded to His
Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ; the Political
Intelligence Department, Foreign Office ; the Secretary to the Government of
India in the External Affairs Department • His Majesty’s Ambassadors at
Bagdad and Ankara ; and to the Middle East Intelligence Centre, Cairo.
Sub-Enclosure to Serial No. (33).
Report by the Press Attache, to British Legation, Tehran, No. 218|14|40,
dated the 18th October 1940.
I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 218|11|40, of 7th September
and to transmit to you the following report.
2. While there is little diminution in pro-German feeling, the tendency
among the minority to think that Great Britain may not be beaten is stronger
and spreading somewhat. It has been noticed, especially in Tabriz, which
was one of the'places most strongly under German influence, that there is a
tendency to view our chances more favourably.
3. The reaction to the German-Italo-Japanese agreement was at first
unfavourable to us. When, however, no material change in the situation was
seen to result from this, public opinion swung round to the view that Japan
had made an error in concluding an agreement from which she would get no
advantage. A few saw in the agreement weakness on the part of Germany, in
that, in spite of her much vaunted strength, she was turning to Japan for
help.
. 4. The reaction to the German occupation of Rumania has been calm.
It is attributed by the public in general to a desire on the part of Germany to
assure herself of Rumanian oil supplies. It is not considered to involve any
material change in the situation, since it is argued that Germany was already
in \iitual control of Rumania. Wishful thinking leads the public to attribute
the German move also to an intention to block any further advance by Russia.
A small minority are fearful lest these events should lead to an extension of
the war area in the Near and Middle East.
5. The belief is growing that America will enter the war. This amounts
m pro-Ally circles almost to a certainty that America will make a declaration
as soon as the presidential election is over. Should the election pass and no
such development follow, there is likely to be disappointment and perhaps
also a reaction in opinion unfavourable to us. Pro-German circles consider
Ilia: ii America does decide to enter the war, Japan will keep her fully occu
pied^ There is a further tendency on the part of those who, while not stronglv
pro-German, yet beheve that Germany will win the war, to regret the pos-
Ribihty of the entry of America into the war on the ground that it would lead
? 1of . tlie . w . ar arca aiKl the prolongation of the war, in other
Germany fAmenCa;,0mS in ’ Britain wiI1 not be so soon disposed of by
G. In German oral propaganda a change in tone can be noticed It nr>
longer lays stress chiefly on German military might, but rather on an alWprT
hffinTr 1 ' 17 0 4! nt f 0 T rcst , T befwc . en Germany and Iran and the former’s desire"to
oW 1 !?' A \ h 7 e ^er there is any special significance in this change is not
*1. a1, tt would be of interest to know whether such a change in German pro
paganda has been noticed in neighbouring countries.
Z e f \ of Ru ssia is for the moment abated. Russian propaganda con-
^ -p * • vG h ne outlined in my last report. There is also on the nurf.
wardTlran. 11 6mpt ° mdiCate that slie is actnafcd P friendly feelings to-