Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎138r] (275/320)

5
fortune to incur the Shah’s displeasure are l\lurteza Quli Samsam Bakhtiari
(No. 49 in Personalities) and Amir Seham-ud-Din Ghaffari (No. 89 in Personali
ties).
2. The former was the last of the important Bakhtiari Khans to escape
trouble. He was detained by the police for two days, and then released. No
reason for this has yet transpired.
3. Amir Seham-ud-Din Ghaffari has recently been head of the Government
industrial school (“ hunaristan ’*), and was reported to have come under Nazi
influence, a thing which his German education and the presence of numerous
Germans participating in the industrial development of this country would
render quite likely. No reason for his arrest and that of his elderly father on
'21st November has been given, and no one has been allowed to see them. But
lie is still drawing his salary in prison as head of the industrial school, while
the police are examining his “ dossier ”, and the general rumour connects him
with a design to form a sort of Nazi party in Iran.
4. The remaining arrests, said to number about thirty, include some army
officers, and the charges are said to be varied.
( 6 )
From Sra R. Bulpard, (Tehran), No. 29, bated the 1st February, 1940.
The Military Attache called at the house of Minister for War January 31st
at the request of the latter. The Minister unexpectedly gave the Military
Attache complete figures of all kinds of aircraft in Iran and then asked for help
in securing aircraft from the United Kingdom which were needed by the spring
for defence of Iran though it might already be too late. The Minister said that
be had instructed Colonel Shaibani to order thirty Wellington bombers and
thirty Blenheim or Beaufort bombers. Could delivery be expedited ? The
Minister agreed that Iran needed fighters and said that thirtv Curtiss machines
would probably be bought in the United States while Colonef Shaibani had been
instructed to try to secure twenty Hurricanes in addition to fifteen promised bv
His Majesty’s Government. The Minister indicated that Italian machines would
probably not be bought because of financial difficulties and of technical objection
to the introduction of another type of aircraft. When the Military Attache
suggested the need for a larger proportion of fighters the Minister agreed, but
insisted on the necessity to carry the war into the enemy camp and expressed
readiness to sacrifice half of the bombing strength of Iran in order to destroy
or damage Baku. In conclusion the Minister speaking very personally and in
confidence said that he thought it was time for “ us ” to co-ordinate plans as we
had the same end in view. He could not say this to the Shah and has suggested
it could only come through diplomatic channels. The Military Attache was very
guarded on this point.
No action will be taken on the suggestion about co-ordination of plans which
could hardly have been made without the Shah’s instructions. The rest of the
minister for War’s communication is an interesting indication of the Iranian
Government’s forecast of Soviet action in the spring and of their probably un
justified belief that their Air Force could do serious damage to Baku.
Repeated to M. U C. E. Cairo No. 4 Government of India No. 12.
(7)
Uofy op Despatch prom British Legation, Tehran, No 49, dated the 10th Feb
ruary 1940.
_ . ttis Majesty’s Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty’s
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit
herewith, copies of the documents mentioned in the subjoined Schedule on the
subject of report alleging movement in Iraqi Kurdistan in favour of independence.
Tehran telegram No. 10 of 10th February 1940 to Bagdad.