Coll 28/39(2) ‘Persia. Printed Correspondence, 1937–’ [‎137v] (274/320)

I
4
tnan a week against Russian troops inferior as were the latter. To this I replied
that it seemed to me that Russia’s preoccupations in the maintenance of an army
in Poland and the carrying on of the Finnish campaign, with the demoralization
and disorganization which these were known to have produced, made it almost,
if not quite impossible for her to undertake further adventures. We ourselves N
had been disposed to regard Russia as incapable of carrying on an external war
and it seemed clear that the Soviet Government had in fact never intended to
become engaged in one. In fact the developments of the last two months en
couraged the belief that the danger of a Russian attack in the South and Middle
Fast was steadily diminishing.
2. Though Faiz Mohammed expressed agreement with my view, he refused
to be altogether comforted. He however, stated in the most emphatic terms his
conviction that if the Finnish war were to continue for three or four months there
would be an internal outbreak in Russia. He was absolutely certain that this
was the case. Bokhara, Khiva, Samarkand and Ferghana were all disaffected
and ripe for trouble : in tact the whole Moslem element in Russia was ready
for revolt if Russia’s present difficulties continued long.
3. I asked Faiz Mohammed whether in expressing these opinions he was
basing himself on definite information. He replied in the affirmative. He told
me that he knew that there still existed in Berlin an organization of representa
tives ot these Moslem districts of Russia, which was engaged in working out
schemes for cheating internal trouble in the Soviet Union. This organization
had existed fior a long time and continued to exist in spite of the present Russo-
German understanding. Faiz Mohammed asserted that it actually worked inside
the German Foreign Office. In addition to this, leaders of these subversive
movements were congregated in Kabul, which was a centre for these activities.
4. As regards the attitude of Afghanistan herself to Russia, His Excellency
spoke very firmly saying that resistance was essential and that British support
was of course greatly to be desired. He advocated the utmost possible touch
between the two Governments.
5. I shortly afterwards met the Iranian Ambassador and asked him what he
lelt about these matters. Monsieur Kazemi agreed with me that Russia was
greatly weakened and that the danger to Iran from that quarter was greatly
diminished. In fact he appeared to be less alarmed than his Afghan colleague
liad led me to expect.
( 4 )
Decypher i-rom Sir H. Kxatchbtjll-Htjgessen (Angora), No. 55, dated the 15th
January, 1940.
Kabul telegram January 11th.
. 1 a shed Minister for Foreign Affairs on January 15th whether he saw
signs of stiffening in Iranian attitude. He replied definitely in the affirmative.
He informed me that Iranian Government had recently applied to Paris for
financial assistance and that Iranian Minister had assured Monsieur Leger that
b rench Government could feel justified in granting such help as Iranian Govern
ment intended to employ it to strengthen themselves against possible dangers
irom Russia. ^
2. Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that developments in Finland had
had a good effect.
Addressed to Foreign Office ;
Kabul, Tehran.
repeated to Govermnent of India, Bagdad,
( 5 )
prow British Legation, Tehran, to Foreign Office, London, No. 396, (E. 120!
120(34), (823(3139), dated the 20th December 1939. I
I ha\e the honour to report that the Shah’s return from a visit to his
noithern estates and to the Turkoman races has resulted in a crop of arrests, as
not infrequently happens. The most important of those who have had the mis-