'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎110v] (225/294)

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CHAPTER 16
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CONCLUSION - SUMviARY OF THE MIN LESSON S
This final chapter represents an attempt to sum up as briefly as ■
possible the principal lessons for the future which have emerged in the
preceding pages.
STRATEGY IN REBELLION
The Courses open to the Autho rities
A civil government or a General Officer Commanding faced with the
task of suppressing rebellion will usually have the choice of two alterna
tives. Either they must adopt repressive measures to crush revolt, or
they may continue a policy of moderation and attempt to maintain so far
as is possible the normal life of the country until reason prevails once
more and rebellion dies a natural death. Experience in Palestine goes
to show that there is no reason to believe that the latter course will
ever succeed unless the authorities are prepared to make some concession
to force rather than use the instruments of force at their own disposal.
If reason was still likely to prevail a state of armed rebellion would
probably never have started, and its very existence proves that the
other side have abandoned reason as an instrument of policy. Thus an
attempt to maintain the normal life of the country under such conditions
only helps to provide the rebel elements with the means of continuing
the struggle, dissipates the strength of the armed forces on unproductive
duties, and inevitably prolongs the period of resistance. Sooner or
later it must lead to the adoption of repressive measures in some degree,
and the longer they are delayed the more severe will they need to become.
Rebellion in fact will seldom be ended by conciliation, and in the long
run the adoption of repressive measures from the very start will probably
be both the most expedient and the most humane way of restoring peace.
The Action necessary to crush rebell ion
Any plan designed to end rebellion must make adequate provision
for three things
(a) The defence of the life and property of that section of the
population which remains in support of law and order.
(b) The protection of vital communications.
(c) The defeat of the rebel armed forces.
In order to achieve this treble object the authorities will have at
their disposal the Police (including any irregular police which may be
enrolled to meet the emergency, and the Fighting Forces.
V/hich of them are employed on which tasks must depend upon the scale
of attack anticipated, and each must be confined to the tasks for which
they are most suited. 'There can be no excuse for using troops on
duties for which the police are better fitted: any attempt to do so
will lead both to a loss of efficiency and a lack of economy of force,
and gaps in the police ranks should be filled by raising more irregular
police and not by diverting troops from military tasks. Of the three
oasks mentioned above, the first should remain primarily the responsi* -
bility of the police, the second will usually require the joint efforts
of police and troops, while the last should be left to the troops alone.