'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎110r] (224/294)

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1700 hrl^’when U they%oncentrated e or tSf remained in Position until
to Nablus. Once on thp d the main road P^ior to returning
learnt of the situation at Beit°Umrin the ^. ® om ® of the Lincolns and
fore decided to advance eastward^ -in , x e Fus * commander there-
enemy on the flanks of the Lincolns- ^, h ° pes of lnt ei-cepting the
twenty to thirty rebels south o/- ■+ , , 30ori saw a P art 7 of about
Dorset platoon he made a oinoni ;5elt In conjunction with the
a position to the East with a v^^taS^ ?h Sa - asty ? and 0 CCU Pi«
In this he was successful qnd a 4 - • en ? m * 5 ' in ' t ^ le
while the diversion he caused rrovidd ° ll1 , lct thirte c n casualties,
southern flank n-p t • n d P ro ^ ld c d opportune protection for the
sou-cnem iianlc of the Lincolns’ withdrawal t? q ^ • n
in oosition nn-m -u n , UIiatawa - L » J-he K.S. Pus. remained
it dawn the next morning aircraft thoroughly reconnoitred the
whole area and dropped supplies for the eighty odd Dorsets in laid-
but no enemy were sighted and it was clear that the survivors ^
bands had made good their escape. At 0900 hrs. Brigade Headquarters
therefore ordered both detachments of Dorsets to re4n to J Jin.
The total enemy casualties proved later to have amounted to at least
forty-two dead and fifteen wounded, though it is almost certain that the
actual figures were much higher. The Government forces had had three
wounded, while during the course of the action over five thousand
rounds of ^.A.A. alone had been expended.
t-he engagement illustrated well the difficulties of carrying out a
planned operation over this sort of ground when adequate reconnaissance
beforehand nad not been possible - as the long delay in reaching Yasid
even without opposition bears witness - and in consequence the complete
dependence upon the course of action taken by subordinate commanders on
the spot. The action of the Dorset platoon and that of the R.S. Pus.
picquet commander are good examples of this. It illustrates also the
elusiveness of the enemy, his skilful use of cover to avoid air action,
and his faculty for escaping from almost any predicament under cover of
darkness if troops are unable to keep close contact during the night'
so as to renew the offensive in the morning. In this case it was
mainly a lack of pack transport which prevented the Striking Forces
going on into the hills after night had fallen. A final lesson of the
engagement was the success which invariably attended any attempt at an
enveloping movement, of which the move round Sabastya provided a good
example.