'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎109r] (222/294)

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It snows the ease with which a thorough defeat could be inflicted
imder sucn conditions, but it shows also the difficulty of completing that
dex eat by preventing the escape of survivors of the first attacks.
The Action near Beit Umri n. (See Map No. 3)
On the night of the 28th September information reached the Head-
quarters of tne^l6th Infantry Brigade at Nablus that a large band under
Fauzi ^uwaqji himself was at Yasid, a village in difficult hill country
some j.ive miles Yorth of Nablus. Air reconnaissance of the area was
ordered for the following morning and three striking forces were to
stand 05 from dawn ready to answer GG calls under the instructions of
the brigade commander. These consisted of:-
2 Dorset Strik ing Force (Jenin) Two platoons, one
machine-gun section, one Mortar detachment.
t N.S. Fus. Strikin g Force (Nablus) :- About one Company.
2 Bedfs. Herts. Striking Fo rce (Nablus) About 200 men.
In addition the 2.Lincoln Striking Force, consisting of one Company
with a naval pom-pom and two armoured cars of the 11th Hussars, remained
in reserve at Tulkarm. Four tanks at Tubas and three at Tulkarm were
also to be ready to move, as well as the section of the Chestnut Troop
R.il.A. and the 45th (How) Field Battery at Nablus. The intention of
the Brigade Commander was to use his three striking forces to converge
from a North, South-East and North-Test direction on any enemy which
might be located by the aircraft*
No news of the enemy was received the following day until about
1000 hrs. when aircraft located mounted men to the West of Yasid,
between that village and Beit Umrin, which lay some four miles distant.
A GG call was sent and at 1020 hrs. Brigade Headquarters issued orders
to put the converging plan into operation. The three striking forces
were ordered to move onto Yasid which was to be occupied by 1215 hrs;
and all aircraft movement over the area was to cease until that hour.
The tanks were to fill the gaps between the converging infantry columns
to the East and ’.Test of Yasid in order to form a cordon to hold rebels
who might try to break back between the columns.
One section of 4“5” howitzers of the 45th Battery was ordered to
the vicinity of Silat adh Dhahr, and that of the R.K.A. 3‘7 M howitzers
was to follow up the R.S. Fus. Striking Force in their advance on
Yasid from the South-East. The remaining section of field howitzers
was to occupy a position close to Nablus with an O.P. on the Jabal nbal
from which enemy could be engaged if they tried to break away to the
South.
The three Striking Forces moved out at about 1100 nrs.; the Dorsets
taking the approach from the North and moving by M.T. over rough tracks
towards Siris village, which lay within tnroe miles 01 -ns oDjecoive,
while the R.S. Fus. followed a good track leading into woods four miles
South-East of Yasid. The Bedfords' debussing point was Jaba, four
miles North—Y/est of Yasid. Both Dorsets and R.S. Fus., c^fter a good many
difficulties in getting transport forward, reached giound quite impaosable
to M.T. and were forced to continue on foot tor the last two or thrte
miles of the approach. This involved a long and arduous carry for the
machine-gunners over very difficult country, and in sonic cases Arabs and
pack animals were commandeered en route to assist. The R.o. Fus. reached
the ridge South of Yasid at 1500 hrs. and occupied a position overlooking
the village preparatory to further reconnaissance, but at 15._o hours