'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎108v] (221/294)

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To take full advantage of every chance encounter it was necessary
that striking forces should be maintained in a high state of readiness
prepared to act on a minimum of orders the moment the G-G- call was
received. After that a good knowledge of the ground, physical fitness
and light equipment, and good intercommunication - especially in respect
of visual and the Middle East Ground Code - were the most important
elements. In deliberate operations results were mostly achieved by
small mobile columns which moved on a wide front to find the enemy and
were capable of concentrating quickly to pin and attack him. For this
purpose converging columns stood a better chance than parallel columns
”driving" against a line of stops. Columns had to be prepared to stay
out for 48 hours without being supplied, and the smaller and more- numerous
they were tne better. Provided a column had the means of sending out
an XX call there was little chance of its ever being overwhelmed, and
even a platoon could be employed independently under such conditions.
The most useful type of column, however, usually comprised a Comp,any
Headquarters and two platoons with one machine-gun and a mortar.
Types of actions with Armed Bands
Descriptions have already been given in a previous chapter of the
type of action resulting from an enemy attack on a "bait” followed by
the arrival of air and land striking forces. To close this chapter two
further typical actions will be described. The first is a chance
encounter occurring at an early period, while the other illustrates
one of the later^engagements resulting from deliberate operations based
on good information in which considerable forces were employed.
The action near Kafr al Laba d. (See Map Ho. 3)
At 0300 hrs. on the 28th July a detachment of the Lincolns were on
their way to occupy daylight picquet on the road between Tulkarm and
Nablus when heavy fire was opened from both sides of the road, wounding
one soldier. ^ XX and GG calls were sent out, and the detachment deployed
and engaged the enemy, killing tv/o and wounding one.
The XX call was picked up by an aircraft on its way back to Ramleh.
at once went to the scene of the action and located a party of seven
armed men to the South-West of Kafr al Labad. Air action was taken
an o e reoels killed. Meanwhile two Harts from Ramleh had
gone to the assistance of the Lincolns, and inflicted a bomb and
machine-gun attack on a band of some twenty to thirty men: twelve
bombs were dropped and a number of casualties were observed. While the
^ ciG ^ on i n progress a land striking force with tanks, armoured
c^rs and a naval pom-pom arrived on the scene and went into action, the
^ cnc i rc ling movement about Bala with a view to cutting
off the retreat of the rebels.
Near this village a party were intercepted and two killed, while
the armoured cars killed one more. By now the bands were dispersing
in haste m all directions, pursued hotly by the aircraft which inflicted
further casualoies. _ The biggest group, of about twenty, was chased
in ° in £ 321 grove west of Kafr al Labad to which troops
G irec e 1 txe aircraft. A search of the area however showed
G ,"‘ 10 i 1 *' 3 iac ^ already flown, and only one dead body remained. By
1700 hrs. all was over, the enemy’s casualties then being reckoned at
not less than 21 killed and wounded.
ine Kafr al Labad action was one typical of the period: it
iliustrates a case^in which the bands were brought to action early in
t. e day m the vicinity of a main road - an ideal state of affairs.