'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎101v] (207/294)

44816-1
156
naturally displayed little activity in combatting rebellious activities
of their own compatriots. The effect of a really strong post of
Jewish Supernumeraries in an Arab village would have been very diff -.
indeed, but this was never tried. The collective fines were of valii
provided the amount was big enough to have a really punitive effect ^
provided its collection was al ways enforced. It was also necessary t
make sure that it was not beyond the capacity of the people to pay °
In Palestine fines were too often never collected in full or were s^r
over such a long series of instalments that their punitive effect was
scarcely felt. Some villages openly refused to pay, and in these
cases it was necessary to confiscate goods to the value of the fine
task which usually required the aid of troops. As neither horses *
cattle or grain was allowed to be seized in payment it was not easy
to assess values, and too often villages escaped with the surrender of
a ramshackle collection of furniture and household goods which were
probably missed far less than the cash. There is no doubt that to be
effective fines must be collected immediately in cash (or perhaps on
occasions even in arms), if cattle and grain is to be exempted, and
sentences of imprisonment inflicted in cases of refusal.
Demol i tion s
Demolitions were a military task alone, though police advice was
usually sought as to which houses were to be demolished. A certain
amount of demolition was of course carried out for purely tactical
reasons, and in such cases compensation was paid, but it is however
punitive demolitions wnich are more the concern of this chapter. In
such cases the buildings chosen were either those from which fire had
be^n detected or those which were known to have harboured rebels in
active opposition to the forces. In the selection police dogs played
an important part by identifying houses which had been occupied by the
enemy In many cases Sappers were summoned at once and the demolition
carried out immediately; while in other cases it was often sufficient
to mark a house for destruction, by daubing it with large circles of
IL ^ e P a: j- n ^> 311 d to withold the actual demolition until such time as fur-
+.] n e:r ? un ^ s ^ imG;ri ^ ^ )ecainG necessary. Demolitions were then conducted on
the lines of the procedure described in Appendix XVII. By far the
iggest operations of this nature ever carried out in Palestine were the
series of actions against the Old City of Jaffa in May and June 1936, and
be worthy of fuller description as a fair sample of the methods
■j. opoe or subduing an urban area which had got completely out of hand
and where every form of law and order had ceased to exist.
The. Jaffa operati ons betwe en the 50th May and_jthe jSOth June
he Old ^ity of Jaffa nad long been a hotbed of lawlessness and
~ uvo , an as such had usually set the example for rebellious activit:
+ coanbr V« Its inhabitants had the reputation of being th<
oug eo o all the Arab elements, consisting mostly of boatmen of
eek descent ^ who earned their living handling lighters in the Port of
(lal - 1 - :LCult ^ dangerous occupation. Their natural dislike oj
° r ^ a greatly increased by the fact that they more than ar
COI ™ i '^ had suffered directly from the influx of Jews.
j-~rvrn Aviv at their very doorstep into the biggest
T ^ GGUn ; o-J^d with its growth many of the commercial glories
, . a D ‘ la G P a ^ted as business tended more and more to centre in Tel
q'hprW r 0 ™ eVen the historic Arab port had been threatened by the
strik- r iL a scheme for Tel Aviv > which appeared likely to
ak p d e ^ ly .fjt.the livelihood of the Jaffa boatmen. They were
and^nrbV ln . th n eir 0wn view " desperate men who had nothing to lose
oo gam oy an appeal to force; and for this purpose the Old C