'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎101r] (206/294)

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Any attempt at thorough searches of the villages became out of the
question if the converging columns were to make contact before dark, and
it is iii 0 nly probable that in these circumstances many rebels who had
buried their arms and hidden themselves went undetected as the drive
passed over tnem. ^ ny aoout 1600 hrs. most of the columns had reached
the general line oi objecoives in an exnausted condition and had
regained visual toncn with each other-from hilltop stations#
Ax uex a brief pause tor much-needed rest each battalion concentrated
on s 01 ne village in tne centre of the unit position where the troops re
mained lor the night, M. being pushed forward as far as it was con
ceivably possible in order to help in the flank columns. Just before
dark tne opportunity was uanen to round up all the men of these villages
and compel them to watch a demonstration either of mortar fire or of
airci ai t dropping uv,- lb. bombs by the dive method. It was hoped that
sucn demonstrations would nave a salutory effect by showing what mi^ht
happen to their own villages in certain eventualities. The Arabs
evinced close interest in the proceedings, but it must be admitted that
on the v/hole they displayed lar less awe than delight in watching a good
explosion - always a joy to any Arab. The majority of the- cordon
troops also concentrated that night; the remainder of which passed
peacefully except for severe sniping of a ration convoy on its way to
Nablus - outside the area of operations - which resulted in the death of
one Seaforth Highlander and the severe wounding of a R.A.S.C. Officer.
The following morning the A.O.G. decided to conclude the operation, and
during the day the troops returned to their camps.
Operation X provided several useful lessons for the future. It
showed that a ’'drive" could not bring to action armed bands which were
prepared to hide until the operation was over unless they could be
either surprised or cornered. The need for strict secrecy to obtain
surprise and the great difficulty of achieving it therefore provided the
first lesson. To corner the bands it was evident that a slower advance
and a far greater number of troops was required to comb an area of the
size selected for the operation; there was no doubt that both the front
ages and the depths of the drive were too ambitious for the forces
available, and equally that the cordon was too attenuated. On the
credit side may be placed a certain loss of prestige which the bands
must have suffered by refusing to fight - though this factor could not
be rated too high in the light of Arab mentality - and the very far-reachin
moral effect of a strong display of force in regions where any visible
representation of authority had seldom been seen. Time was to show how
very long this impression lasted; and the best testimonial to the
value of Operation X lay in the fact that the area involved, after being
one of the worst in all Palestine, ceased to give further trouble for
the rest of the rebellion and for long after it.
PUNITIVE ACTI ON
General
Punitive action took the form of punitive searches on the lines
already described, of the establishment of punitive police posts,^the
imposition of collective fines, and the demolition oi houses. -lie
last is of most interest from a military point of view, and the only ^
one which need be enlarged upon in these pages. ^he punitive police
posts consisted of supernumerary police installed for a iixed period at
the expense of the inhabitants of the village or area concerned. ^ In
practice the effect was little more than that of a fine owing to tne
fact that the police chosen to man the post were invariably Arabs who