'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎92v] (189/294)

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a GG- call, and ground strips would be laid down to indicate the 1 0Ca t•
of the enen^y. While the combined efforts of the aircraft and the we ° n
already in action on the road were pinning the enemy and inflicting " POnS
casualties, the military striking force on arrival would halt out of
sight while the commander carried out his reconnaissance. After that
all efforts would be concentrated on manoeuvring the striking force
behind the enemy in order to encircle him and close. Meanwhile the
advanced guard infantry, as soon as they had cleared a gap through the
block, would lead the convoy through at speed beyond the danger area.
Where there was no road block and heavy fire was opened, the°advanced
guard 7/ould halt and give covering fire while the convoy drove on at
speed with automatic weapons firing on the move to keep the enemy’s head
down. If the fire was light - such as that of a few casual snipers - 5
there would be no halting of any vehicle, though the armoured cars and
machine-gun lorries might "spray” the hills on passing if any likely
targets vrere visible. It may be worth recording that very' few casualties
were ever caused among occupants of convoyed vehicles, though on a
large number of occasions attacks upon convoys led to casualties being
inflicted upon armed bands. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that
military effort expended upon convoying was amply justified.
RAILWAY PROTECTION
General
In Palestine sabotage on the railway had some important differences
from that on the roads. As a rule attacks on the roads were serious
only when they were directed against the traffic using them, whereas on
the railway rebel efforts were concentrated upon the line itself as
being the best way of damaging the trains and" their occupants. Pew
sections of the line ran through hill country suitable for ambushes,
an' provictuc who line remained intact the speed of a train alone was
a e l u a e protection against fire attacks. The saboteur therefore aimed
o mllict damage by means of derailments, which were of course far
more sa is aci,oiy from his point of view than the mere killing or
Passengers in a passing train. As a consequence the
• In ^“ 1 e or ^ 1 “ ;as directed to the prevention, detection and re
pair ol sabotage of the permanent way.
Sections of the railway requiring military protec tion
orot^"l f ww° nG ^f 1Uary cava d requirements coincided, and led to
of two --v-mnr^ lnS + a ord ’ e(i whole railway system with the exception
before ^ 0 ^ ctlon s. The line from Affula to Nablus was out of use
the a-Hvnl ^ n ° P rotecti on was required until after
th e q OG t-i ? a 6 ' ai S e rcy Porce, when it became necessary to open
the TroolTr^ TTa ^ ^ W ^eers to carry supplies to
Tulkam Sd S ° Ut NabluS * The other section was that between
th-se^wo toms I railwa y bridge crossed the road which linked
rebels sroo-vri i ^ ‘ /nich . fomed a most important military route. Had
operations we / n : ° PPlnS this on to the road at a time when
as no suitoblo^al to-^ 0 )-^ 033 the conse< l uenG os might have been very serious,
traffic wa- Toosc.-i'hl a lve route was available and no deviation for motor
in the Jbell?on a ^ at tem P t to blow up the bridge early
demolitSn bein^ of this ^d led to its total
aTact ^Lh not oZ ^ the 42nd Pield Company on the 13th June,
^tSL off N«h1n ^ ! em ° V f a S ° UrCe 0f Potential danger but by
sabotage can' strike both^ays? 01111111 ^ 10 ^ 10113 provided a time1 ^ hint that