'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎92r] (188/294)

44816-1
137
showed himself. Neither could be assured at night, which was an addi
tional reason for the prohibition of night traffic, and the former
required the institution of a convoy system and legislation to force
all traffic to move only in convoy. Convoying of civilian traffic, though
on a voluntary basis only, started at the beginning of the rebellion
and was a responsibility of the police until the military assumed control
on the 13th. May. Prom that date civil and military traffic travelling
between the North and South was marshalled daily at about 1000 hours at
Jerusalem, Affula and Kefr Saba (for Jaffa and Tel Aviv), whence it was
conducted under military escort to a central meeting point at Deir
Sharaf, the main road junction North of Nablus. There the vehicles in
the three convoys were changed over so that the original escorts could
return in charge to the same three starting points. A military courier
service was run in conjunction with the system. At first, for the sake
of convenience, escorts continued through to Deir Sharaf regardless of
area boundaries but later owing to the variations of escorting methods
of different commanders it was found preferable to confine responsibili
ties within the bounds of the military areas. This led to certain waste
of time, since an escort might have to wait an hour or two at the
boundary before picking up the return convoy, but waiting escorts were
always of value as a temporary picquet and served as a useful reserve
when attacks occurred near the borders of two areas, as was often the
case.
These daily convoys naturally provided a tempting bait to the
ambushers, and were used deliberately as one means of bringing uhem to
action. For this purpose a Rodex vehicle was included in order to
summon aircraft, while the land striking forces either followed at a
short distance behind or - more often - stood by at convenient centres
ready to answer "GC" calls. Picquetting in Palestine was never close
enough to permit of convoys travelling without escorts, and these were
strengthened deliberately in order to lose no opportunity of pinning
the enemy to his ground the moment he appeared. Gun lorries were
therefore often included to hold the enemy in conjunction with automatic
weapons until striking forces of aircraft and troops could reach the
scene. The strength of any escort depended upon the intervals between
picquets and the chances of encountering an armed band on che route.
The smallest consisted of an advanced guard of one armoured car followe
by a truck-load of troops, with a single armoured car as rearguard.
The infantry were required to remove road blocks under cover o e
armoured car’s fire and to guard the convoy when at rest. Where
armoured cars were not available their place was taken by a true*,
armoured if possible, in which an automatic weapon was moun e .
firing. If necessary the advanced guard was increased by the addit
of a machine gun lorry or a second truckload of troops or ° ^ ^
the rearguard by a gun lorry or machine-gun lorry or „
Since fire wae usually opened from the flank or rear rather than f rom
the front it was better to keep the pinning weapons wc _ -
column. In the main body of the convoy there was always a Ro
vehicle, near the head but far enough back to minmise risk from mines,
and one or more troop lorries or machine-gun Ioxj. res ,
intervals amongst the convoyed vehicles accoi ing o VO v. As
opposition anticipated and the number ox ve re es ^ propor-
a~ rule they totalled about twenty among which would always be^prop
tion of military vehicles, such as ration^ orries ^ Throughout
armed men who in themselves provided ad i ion R ready for instant'
the column magazines were charged and a t at 200 . Enemy
action: by day sights were set at 400 ^ d
fire in daylight was usually opened from a °u
, • + ^-p Q-n attack depended upon whether or not
The action taken in event of an attaCK oep +he inf antry of the
the road was blocked. If there was a road bl °ter of fire of the
advanced guard would start to remove it undone ^ machine _ gun lorries
armoured car, while m the rear thu enemy with
would pull into the side of the road necessar^ by
fire. The Rodex would send out its XX call, ioiiow