'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎90v] (185/294)

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extensive, but has the disadvantage that it is not likely to be easy to
secure civil permission to withdraw troops if sabotage increases so
much later on as to make complete abandonment of the system desirable.
In Palestine it took nearly two companies of infantry in addition to
R. Signals to look after six exchanges, (with their linemen), the
Broadcasting Station, and one special vulnerable point connected with
the system. Finally it is worth remembering that maintaining the line
by military action means preserving it for the benefit of the disloyal
as well as the loyal elements.
ROAD PROTECTION
The Road itself
At the start of the rebellion attacks were directed rather more to
the road itself than to the traffic upon it, though later the reverse
was more the case after the appearance of the armed bands. The road
problem was slightly different from that presented by the pipe-lines
and telephones in that effective sabotage was far more difficult,
needed more tools and skill, and took much longer to complete. Hence
patrols stood a better chance of interrupting the work at least, even
if they might still fail to catch the culprits. To begin with
sabotage mostly took the form of obstruction with rocks etc. and attempts
to blow up bridges, but in the later stages mines were more in favour.
Obstructions were almost entirely the work of local villagers and where
they were not combined with an ambush had only a delaying value. In
some cases they were however rather more formidable than they sound:
the bigger ones even extended at times over a hundred yards of surface,
and in places^where a steep hillside overlooked the road rocks might be
rolled down of a size which called for elaborate efforts in their removal.
minor vice of the same type, which was hardly less effective in action,
was the strewing of nails or even specially-prepared barbs of twisted
iron. Those who have experienced a front-wheel burst with oversize
S 'K? a ” t S eS J .° n / Py eci P itous mountain road can well imagine the uncomfort-
ble effect of this form of H terrorism M . To combat the nuisance
egis a ion was introduced which allowed soldiers to compel inhabitants
to remove any obstruction from a road; and many a bystander who had
e ec e< J na i s and waited to see what happened when military transport
? 0U ? spendin S a ^usy hour or so on his hands and knees
m-inr} G ^° a 1 13 WaS exac ^ p N the sort of retaliation which the Arab
^ derstood ? nail-strewing died an early death. Even before
a pr ° X11 ? 1 N oP an Arab garage - or even a wayside mechanic - to
. x e ° 0me a matter of stron 3 suspicion, so that
nature e ^ er ^ o DS truetion of this type was entirely rebellious in
detect SSer obstru ctions the institution of patrols to
handican an^ m ° Ve io 4 -vJ m SOOn P reven ' ted them from becoming any serious
si; ,o ° r bri «— s ° ■ *
onnorturvi t-i oe v. tV . ln th ‘ LS direc tion m spite of the many
poses all ove*r tt^^V** 0111 a wides P read use of explosives for civil pur-
more than 24 hnn^ C0Un Pn no ca se was traffic ever stopped for
arteries vet in ° f dama £ ed bridges on any of the main
are no less than 1 q G * oP roa d between Jerusalem and Jenin there
S bridge saboSi T P ° rtant brid S^ and 117 culverts. The antidote
engineers who we?e held^res^^ a ® tec '! :ion b ^ Parols and repair by
defence measures, as with the nfT v SUltable cent res; while passive
a fair degree of immunity. Formatelv Tfn SUCC f sful in
station guards on the road bridged L it did'IfH 60 ^ 6 / 60653 ^
would nrobablv • I - J - U ^es, as it did on the railway, or it
infantry to this duty. neGessar y to divert another two companies of