'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎90r] (184/294)

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of wire; v/hat is more it harmed no one but the British, the Jews and
the rich town Arabs, and so was regarded as fair game by every villager
within reach. In fact in a great many cases there was definite evidence
pointing to the village responsible. ¥ith telephone line sabotage
therefore, more than with any other, civil action could provide a strong
deterrent when properly applied. It goes without saying that stem
collective punishments must be meted out to villages v/hich can be
proved to have been involved, while in addition the line may be parcelled
out among them and the headmen warned that any interference in their
sections will be followed by collective fines or other punishment.
This was tried in Palestine in the later stages and failed only because
the threatened penalties were too often never exacted. Another civil
measure v/hich aided military action was the declaration of a curfew zone
along the main communications. This enabled troops to open fire on
the roads etc. at night - the time when most sabotage took place - with
a minimum of risk to innocent persons.
Military protection of the system was afforded in the first place
by providing guards over the main telephone exchanges, from vhich
escorts were despatched with the breakdown gangs, while in those with a
purely Arab staff R. Signals personnel were installed as monitors. The
escorting of breakdown gangs was also carried out mostly by the R.
Signals, who in addition gave a good deal of much-needed help in the
actual repair work. Most of the civil linemen were Arabs, who loyally
continued their work under great difficulties in spite of much overv/ork,
due to the continual sabotage, and constant intimidation. At first a
roadside camp of some 45 of these men was installed in the centre of the
sabotage area, but it soon became necessary to move them into Nablus for
reasons of safety, while in other cases linemen were based upon protected
exchanges^ Even so intimidation continued and broken poles would be
found ’with H Black Hand” warnings threatening death to any Arab who
continued to carry out repairs, v/hile men at work or en route to a job
were always liable to attack. All this combined to strain the linemen
almost to breaking point, and but for the protection and assistance
given to them by their R. Signals escorts they would certainly have
given up entirely at an early stage.
Protection of the line itself was combined entirely v/ith that of
the roads, and both can best be considered together later. Again
untiring efforts to obtain surprise were the chief requirement, since
telephone line sabotage was so quickly done that straightforv/ard patrol
ling would hardly ever catch the saboteur in the act and was even of^
doubtful value as a deterrent. Two mechanical devices v/ere also tried,
but neither met ’with very much success. The electrification of certain
sections of the line claimed one or two victims at first out had many
technical difficulties, v/hile the Arabs soon learnt to throv/ ropes
over the wires to break connection before continuing with tne work.
In some districts camelriders were used to cut the wires without
having to swarm up the poles. The other was a device by which t e
location of a break could be detected the moment it occarro , so
troops in M.T. could rush out at once to the spot.^ j.nis ma^
helped tov/ards quick repairs, but generally the saboteur was o i m o
the darkness the moment he detected the lights or sound o a cm ana
had vanished by the time it reached the break.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that any attemp^ to main
tain telephone and telegraph communications by force of arms is se
worth while. At the best constant interruption, couplea with the need
for secrecy wherever a native staff mans the exc xanges, mus i ,
military to rely more and more upon their R/T an / • ,
often be better to rely entirely upon these rather than to divert m
troops to purely defensive duties. In any cas^ mi ^ - v inval
should be confined to the defence of telephone exc ange c ^ nQt
workers. This may ensure a limited service w ere -