'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎43v] (91/294)

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64
THE SYSTEM OP ADMINISTRATION
Prior to the arrival of the Emergency Force in September, local
administration of all forces in Palestine (other than those of the fin
Navy) was the concern of the A.O.C., while the G-.O.G. , Egypt, was ^
responsible for the general administration of the troops.
This
systet
has already been referred to earlier in the chapter: though it had it
disadvantages there is no doubt that it was the best one under the
circumstances, and it conferred at least one henefit in giving Palesti
direct access to the substantial administrative resources then concenfr*.
in Egypt for the "Italian Emergency". The effect of the system was to
constitute Egypt as the Base for Palestine with KQ 'British Trooos in
Egypt" in the position of a sort of HQ Lines of Communication.
In September the Base was changed to Haifa, though Egypt still
remained a subsidiary source of supply. In view of their responsibili.
ties regarding general administration, "British Troops in Egypt" under-'
took the preparation of the Base - even though it was in Palestine - ani
operated it until the Emergency Force had completed deployment and there
were sufficient resources available in the country for the responsibdr
to be transferred to the G.O.C. Palestine. From that time onwards ^ '
administration in Palestine reverted to the normal methods of war.
The general lay-out and system in operation in October is shown in
Map No. 1.
MAINTENANCE
me maintenance of personnel in the field was practically confined
to tne clespatch of reinforcing units. Casualties were low and, exceet
for small bodies of individuals mostly from rear parties, there was no
ow o draxts to maintain strengths. Reinforcements came from Egypt
by roaa or rail, with the exception of one infantry brigade from Malta
^^gcnciV Force from nngland, both of which arrived by sea at
+ hm,"-' 11 '*• 7 :ie wor ^ 01 "k* 16 2nd- Echelon was performed by the
staff of "A" Branch at Three K.Q.
w .. 0f n t' terial > prior to the formation of the Haifa Base,
slaftl t 7 e Gombined Array and H.A.P. Supply Depot at
E V ' ! t a rai i connecti on to lydda Junction'. The Combined
POt ® a 7 t "7 th both Ordnance and R.A.S.C. supplies. local
the o a lar S e extent and, where this was not possible,
deli vlv*. "a-i l oc 6 rail consignments from Sgypt. The Depot
the newest BE- W ^ ^ fir3t ’ either ^ K.T. convoy or by rail to
sudoI^ dr-iot n 1 °S , /^ enCe Unit . trarLS P° r t collected. Later, advanced
to* suonl” 1 the .-E+v" su PP lies were opened at Haifa and Jerusalea
sttlSivereHo S Tl vZfZ though C S.D.
The locatinn r,f +v, „ ; r - nlto end to troops in the Sarafand area,
cold s? f 1 SU ? P B Dep0ts was influenced by the fact that
In addition De+nn ha<i ^ een ere cted at Haifa and Jerusalem.
*ere an adStro E IB 6 D ^° ts Were ^tablish.ed at Affula and Mica,
petrol had to be Pn p ie araaval of supplies by train daily, oil and
not be forecast ~ to tne daily requirements could
unavoidabl^owing to inS^reT Personnel, but was
which was treated in the same Sa-d™ lnse ° ure oonmunioations. Pe tro l,
from the Shell Cc nf* v as su PPlics, was obtained locally
at Haifa,1SsS;m°Lf
both in bulk and tins and in . tlx advancec l supply depots and C.b.D.
four-gallon tins v/hirb nn i ^ ^ nQ plaCes direct to units in expendable
tion of petrol" by the fore^ n ° re filled. The approximate consu^P'
of which" went to the Amv 136 ^ 500 gallons per month 76,500
to the Forces Srrng the R ' A - F - petrol ^
ring the whole rebellion totalled 833,401 gallons.