'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎43r] (90/294)

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CHAPTER 8
ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL
It is not intended to describe here in any detail the numerous
administrative problems which were presented by these operations, nor
the solutions applied to them. The great majority owed their origin
exclusively to the special conditions existing in Palestine at the time;
and few of the lessons are likely to be capable of general application
elsewhere. There are several reasons for this, of which geography
accounts for most. Others originated through the unusual system of
dual administration by Air Headquarters at Jerusalem and H.Q. British
Troops at Cairo, which is scarcely likely to find a parallel anywhere
else; and to the strange state of semi-war~semi‘-peace in which the
army found itself - due to a great extent to the absence of Martial Law.
A certain number of minor lessons of an administrative nature are
referred to in other chapters - notably No. 9 on ’’Transport" and No. 10
on "Weapons and Equipment" ~ and it is necessary here to refer only to
two outstanding general points which will almost certainly arise again
some day. The first is an old story and is summed up in the one word
"Improvisation". There is little need to enlarge upon this, except to
say that where a military garrison in normal times contains no detach
ments of Royal Engineers, Royal Corps of Signals or Royal Army Ordnance
Corps, then the administrative staffs must be prepared to resort to
extensive improvisation in an emergency.
The other point, which has been referred to already, is that
operations on active service cannot be conducted under conditions of
peace-time accounting without causing inconvenience and much extra work
for troops in the field and for staffs. The British Pbrces in Palestine
were declared to be "On Active Service" with effect from the 21st May.
At that time there were two main factors which prompted the Air Officer
Commanding to make the declaration: the first was to ensure that
casualties in action were placed on the same footing so far as pensions
etc. were concerned as normal war casualties, and the other was to give
commanders in the field those powers under Military Law which are
applicable only to active service. Under instructions from the War
Office, however, "Active Service" was limited in its application to
Military Law, discipline, and wills alone, and did not affect the normal
financial scale and entitlements (except to exempt battle casualties
from hospital stoppages), nor the normal accounting procedure. The
effect of this modification was to burden officers with much paper work
on matters such as a rifle butt shattered by an enemy bullet, a lorry
damaged by a road mine, clothing destroyed in a train derailment, and
so on. It also entailed innumerable courts of inquiry, which would
never have been necessary in war, on casualties and material losses due
directly to the operations. It is questionable v/hether the financial
saving effected in this way really amounted to much, but it is certain
that the system was the cause of considerable irritation and took up
far too much of the time of units and staffs already overworked and
usually short-handed. On the other hand it did undoubtedly avoid some
hardship by permitting the continuance of subsistence allowances, which
would not otherwise have been issuable on active service. However, on
the whole experience went to show that once active service conditions
exist in the field the administrative system will be better placed in
to to on an active service footing, and conducted in accordance with
Field Service. Regulations, Vol.I. This of course requires the publi
cation by the War Office of a special Army Order amending Appendix IV,
King’s Regulations 1935, to govern the altered conditions.