'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎31v] (67/294)

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Agents
There was unavoidably a certain amount of competition between the
S.S a 0’s and the Police for the services of good agents, ana for that
reason alone it was essential that the army intelligence officer should
not be brought into the field as a third competitor. The life of an
informer in Palestine was an extremely dangerous one, and agents needed
and deserved adequate payment; but it was also very necessary that^
inexperienced personnel without good local knowledge should noo spoil
the market by paying for unimportant information. ^ payment in strict
proportion to results was found to be the only satisfactory method.
Widespread intimidation added to the difficulties of the agent's
work, and the problem of getting his information back in time for it to
be acted upon was a formidable one, so that much good informauion from
the more remote hill districts was sometimes not only too late to be
used but might even be misleading., A very good kno.vledge of the habits
and capabilities of the armed bands was required if this cor.-, of infor* Ph
mation was to be interpreted to the best advantage, and the S.S.O. was
invariably best qualified to apply it.
Inhabi ta nt s
Sympathy with the rebels, intensified by universal intimidation,
made it virtually impossible to obtain from Arab inhabitants or prisoners
any useful information regarding the enemy. On the other hand they were
usually quite ready to give information of a topographical nature.
This was frequently volunteered and was usually correct, and anyone with
even a smattering of Arabic could as a rule obtain a certain amount of
this sort of intelligence. Jewish inhabitants were generally ready
with a mass of information, little of which was ever of any value,
often lurid tales were told with the principal object of keeping troops
in the vicinity. Responsible Jewish sources were however very well
informed on the whole.
Aircraft
The broken nature of the country and the dispersion and concealment
normally adopted by the enemy made it difficult to locate them either
from the air or the ground, and this was especially true of the olive
grove districts in the hills. Aircraft were forced in consequence to
fly very lov/ when reconnoitring. More difficult still was to distin
guish between hamless and hostile Arabs, since armed bands seldom moved
in formed bodies by day. The best indication was of course small arms
fire from the ground, which could usually be heard when directed at the
aircraft. But the Arabs learnt this after a while, and later tended to
with-hold their fire until they had been located.
Air photographs were used extensively and proved of great value.
In the absence of hostile anti-aircraft artillery it was possible to
produce mosaics to a wide extent. Where information regarding roads
and tracks was required it was found that an oblique will often give the
derails just as well as a vertical and will cover more ground.
Air reconnaissance was also very useful for locating road-blocks
and serious damage to bridges, railways and pipe-lines; while the value
of personal air reconnaissance by army officers - especially prior to
detailed ground reconnaissance — was once again very clearly demonstrated.