'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎31r] (66/294)

4481S-1
45
CHAPTER 6
INTELLIGENCE AND INTERCONI/iUNICATION
TI-~E COLLECTION ON INFORI.iATIQN
The System
There were three organizations for the collection of information:
Force H.Q. "I" Branch which covered both Palestine and Trans-Jordan,
the Criminal Investigation Department of the Palestine Police which
covered Palestine alone, and the "I” Section of the Arab Legion which
covered onlg Trans-Jordan. Each had its independent organizations for
collecting information and for maintaining liaison with the other two.
The Special Service Officers
Apart from that supplied in the normal way through the Intelligence
Officers of lower formations, the bulk of military information at Force
H.Q. came from the R.A.F. Special Service Officers. In normal times
S.S.O's were stationed in Palestine at Jerusalem and Haifa and in Trans-
Jordan at Amman and Ma’an, but as the rebellion developed others were
appointed to Jaffa, Nablus, Nazareth and the Jordan Valley. Their
duties ’were to procure information of a military, political and topo
graphical nature, and to keep in touch with feeling in the country by
touring their districts. Though directly under the orders of Force
H.Q. they maintained close liaison 'with local military commanders, the
District; Administration and the police. They employed their own agents
for the collection of information.
The S.S.O. system, superimposed upon the normal army intelligence
system, was very successful and in no way caused either duplication or
interference with each other. The S.S.O. was usually an Arabic-speak
ing officer with special local knowledge, he alone was authorised to
employ agents, and he reached many sources inaccessible to the array
intelligence officer. The latter on the other hand collected and
collated the vast amount of varied information obtained by the fighting
troops, and relieved the S.S.O. of much oi the routine work, particular
ly that concerned with topographical information. S.S.O’s had their
own wireless cars and reported direct to Force H.Q*, so that the value
of their information was greatly enhanced Dy the speed with which it
arrived. As officers of Force H.Q. they had direct access to jLocal
commanders, and this personal contact was a valuable asset to the latter.
In future operations of the some nature it is probable that some similar
intelligence system will be found a necessary addition to tne normal
army one.
Police Intelligenc e
The special difficulties of the police have already been explained,
and they were particularly apparent in the collection of information.
In addition it must be confessed that there was a certain lack of colla
boration and a lack of confidence in each other between the Police C.I.D.
and the Force Intelligence Service. It was perhaps inevitable, in view
of the attitude of the Arab section of the police and the peculiar cir
cumstances existing in consequence, that there was insufiicient consul
tation or personal liaison between the two organizations working on
exactly parallel lines. Police reports of an urgent nature were often
late in reaching military sources, and there was a noticeable inclino.-
tion on the part of Police officers to over-estimate both the authenti
city and the value of information supplied. After one or two experi
ences of this kind new arrivals in Palestine were apt to regard all
police information with a certain amount of suspicion*