'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎26v] (57/294)

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The effect of propagand a
Another element of policy which did much to encourage the rebels to
continue and had also a discouraging effect upon the troops was the
lack of counter-propaganda by the British authorities. ihe rebels
used extensive and bombastic propaganda which received wide publicity^
was entirely believed by a credulous peasantry , and wa^ enormously
exaggerated in uassing from mouth to mouth. It took two main forms.
One consisted of fantastic accounts of the "successes" of the armed
bands including wild figures of the alleged casualties inflicted upon
British forces. Many results of military action were nullified by
reports of this type, especially as colour was often given to them by
the fact that the enemy was frequently left in possession of the field
when engagements took place in the late evening and vvas able to snipe
columns on their way home. It did not need much imagination to
translate this into a "victory" in which British troops had been
"driven back". The other form of propaganda comprised the disemina-
tibh of the wildest stories, of British "excesses", evidence of which
was sometimes deliberately manufactured. It is only necessary to
quote the Press story that British aeroplanes were dropping poisoned
sweetmeats to show the length to which this type of propaganda was
carried. Both forms were a constant source of annoyance to the
troops who would have welcomed at least a firm denial.
About the middle cf June some counter-propaganda measures were
instituted at the request of the military commander, but it is
doubtful whether they had much value. Mostly they consisted of the
dropping of pamphlets by aeroplanes and propaganda from the Govern
ment broadcasting station. In both cases the method of distribution
was obviously suspect, while few villagers could read the pamphlets
and the wireless reached only a small and rather more sophisticated
audience. On the other hand the delicacy of the government in
referring to their opponents was fastidious in the extreme. At a
very early stage an order was issued that Hauranis - who formed the
tougher elements in the town rioting and were mostly illegal
immigrants from Syria or Trans-Jordan - were to be referred
to only as "countrymen". Troops were definitely forbidden to speak
of "raids" on villages, the words "rebel" or "enemy" were strictly
discouraged, the rebellion itself was tactfully called "the strike"
or simply "disturbances", while even the punitive demolitions in the
old city of Jaffa were described officially as "town-planning".
This type of delicacy leaves the field open to the other side and,
to say the least, makes the armed forces of the Crown appear some
what ridiculous.
There is no doubt that a systematic dissemination of accurate
information and fair commentary on the situation is a valuable aid
to restoring order under such conditions and a source of encourage
ment to those employed upon this task.
TitE MAIN LESSONS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE MIL I TARY OPE RATIONS
Tc sum up, the main lessons of this chapter are as follows:
(l) A conciliatory policy alone will seldom end a rebellion.
Sooner or later some form of repressive measures will have to he
employed, and the sooner they are employed the less will be the
degree of severity required.