'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎26r] (56/294)

44 - 816-1
35
THE EFFECT OF POLICY ON THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
The Military Objec t
u Imperial Policing ,, describes a dual object which was directly
applicable to Palestine and which was in fact quoted word for word in
an Operation Instruction issued at the time:-
(i) To prevent interference with the normal life of the affect ed
district, i.e,, to maintain communications in operations and t q_
protect li fe and prope rty.
(ii) To get to grips with the hostile elements and brinp; them into
s ubjection*
In Palestine these two objects v/ere in constant rivalry. Since
troops were acting only in support of the civil power, their main
object was selected by the civil authorities. The Palestine Govern
ment, in pursuit of its policy of "protecting life and property", gave
prominence to No. (i) and until the armed bands appeared - which was
not until the rebellion had run about one-third of its course - ooject
No. (ii) remained chiefly one for the police. by this time so many
troops were committed in pursuit of the first object tnat the attain
ment of the second was beyond the power of the remainder.
Again " Imperial Polici ng" lays down that " passive defence wil l
not restore lawand or der , while e ven its temporary adoption cannot
fail to encourage and strengthen the opposition . Offensive measures_
are therefo re essential, and shou ld be initiated at the earliest
possibl e moment and continued until the object is achi ejyech
The
-u. w ~ ^
offensive should not only be directed against the hostile—armed
forc es but should also aim at the capture or arrest of the lea ders".
Yet the Army and the Royal Air Force had been forced into a largely
defensive role: even against the armed forces they were restricted
in their use of weapons, prisoners captured by them frequently
escaped the penalties of their crimes under the civil^law, while the
acknowledged leaders remained at liberty taking no pains to disgpise
either their movements or their intentions. It remains to be seen
what effect this had upon the Crown Forces.
The Effect of a mainly Defensiv eJRole
The first visible effect was upon the number of troops required.
It will never be possible to guard every point of danger, and nothing
dissipates strength so quickly as the frequently unproductive work of
static defence. The continual flow of reinforcements to Palestine
tells its own story: as fast as they arrived they were absorbed in
guard duties until at last it became necessary to send out a whole
additional Division.
It had also an important effect on morale. Continual guard
duties with little excitement and many nights out of bed, coupled
with a general lack of recreational facilities, soon became irksome
to the troops. The lack of opportunity of getting to grips in an
open fight was very discouraging, while all the more galling was the
sight of oolice held in reserve to be rushed out to the scene of an
engagement while the soldier was left to perform the more hum-drum
duties of the policeman. The officers too found little scope with
their men tied up in guard duties, while the complicated restrictions
on the use of arms and the rigorous investigation by the civil author
ities of every alleged "incident" only served to re-affirm an old sus
picion that "duty in aid of the civil power" provides nothing but
pitfalls for the unwary.