'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎87r] (173/248)

167
tion of the oil-fielda, and at the same time suggested the
reinforcement of the force to a strength of two divisions.
On the 30th January India pointed out that the Karun
and the oil-fields were a secondary objective only, and
realising how greatly their responsibilities in Mesopo
tamia were growing, asked for the return of one of their
divisions from Egypt. Meanwhile a small force was sent
up the Karun.
On the 5th February, 1915, the Secretary of State told
India that the War Office could give no help, but impressed
on us the view that it was most important to bring the
force in Mesopotamia up to two divisions.
India did not consider herself strong enough to do this
without help from elsewhere but on the 5th March received
direct orders to do so, it being definitely stated that the
Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief were relieved of all
responsibility of possible consequences in India itself;
consequently the 12th Division was hurriedly formed and
despatched. This division was intended merely to
strengthen the local defensive
On the 9th April, 1915, Sir J. Nixon assumed the com
mand of Indian Expeditionary Force “ D.”
Our policy, then, up to the middle of April did not con
template an advance up either the Tigris or the Euphrates
beyond Kurna, and aimed only at the defence of the
vicinity of Basra and of the oil-fields. The action at
Shaiba and the occupation of Ahwaz were purely defensive
measures due to the enemy’s advance on Basra and his
activity in the direction of the oil-fields area.
The Commission in referring to arrangements made in
this phase give the impression {vide paragraphs 8 and 55)
that offensive action was intended in the earlier stages of
the campaign, that is, up to the end of this phase.
As shown above, such operations were not contemplated.
Nevertheless, in view of possibilities, on December 30th,
1914, General Officer Commanding, Force “ D,” was
asked by India for his requirements in river craft for use
above Kurna, though he himself had not suggested any
such need.
8. Phase II.—The expulsion of the Turks from Persian
Arabistan, followed by the occupation of Arnara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Euphrates.
The policy of His Majesty’s Government during this
phase was still one of caution and in essence defensive.
The operations, which included those in Arabistan, the
advance to Amara and that to Nasariyeh, were designed
merely to secure our hold on Basra and the oil-fields.
On the 24th April, 1915, the Secretary of State laid down
that an advance beyond the then theatre of operations
would not be sanctioned by Government at present;
that during the summer we must confine ourselves to the
defence of the oil interests in Arabistan and of the Basra
vilayet; that he would be prepared to sanction an
advance to Amara, with a view to adding to the security
of the pipe line, should such an advance be possible after
smashing the enemy in the direction of the Karun and
should it receive the support of India ; that, however,
any plan involving undue extension and possible demands
for reinforcements was to be deprecated ; that a safe
game must be played in Mesopotamia.
On the 23rd May the Secretary of State sanctioned an
advance on Amara, on the condition that no reinforce
ments were necessary for this.
On the 31st May the movement commenced and Amara
was occupied on June 3rd.
On the 11th June General Nixon showed the necessity of
occupying Nasariyeh for the effective protection of the
Basra vilayet, and asked if an advance thither required
the sanction of the Secretary of State.
On the 13th June India informed the Secretary of State
of General Nixon’s proposal to move on Nasariyeh and
supported it.
On the 22nd June no objection having been raised by the
Secretary of State, India informed General Nixon that
he had full liberty of action with regard to advancing on
Nasariyeh. Nasariyeh was occupied on the 25th July,
1915.
Paragraph 85 of the Commission’s report, in taxing
India with lack of foresight, implies that during this
Phase II an advance to Kut-al-Amara, an advance beyond
that place to Baghdad, and the despatch of reinforcements
from oversea to Mesopotamia, should all have been fore
seen, and preparations should have been made to meet
C 48-176)
such developments. It will be seen from the summary
above that the policy of His Majesty’s Government in
regard to such an advance was quite indefinite and appears
to have been guided by the situation rather than by an
ultimate objective. If this is so, then preparations for a
contingency which was not communicated to the
Government of India could hardly be justified.
9. Phase III.—The capture of Kut-al Amara, advance to
Ctesiphon and subsequent retreat to Kut.
Government policy in this phase cautiously sanctioned
an advance to Kut-al-Amara and then, after the capture
of that place, aimed boldly and without warning at the
occupation of Baghdad.
On the 26th July, 1915, India proposed to the Secretary
of State the occupation of Kut for strategical reasons and
suggested that for this purpose a reinforcement of one
brigade from Aden be sent to Force “ D.”
On the 30th July the Secretary of State wired that no
reinforcements could be spared for Mesopotamia; that a
cautious strategy was necessary ; but that the strategic
importance of Kut was recognised.
On the 2nd August General Nixon emphasised the advan
tages of occupying Kut. In this telegram General Nixon
gave no indication of any anxiety as to his ability to
carry out the operation or of any difficulty likely to be
experienced owing to the shortage of riiver craft.
On the 4th August India informed the Secretary of State
of General Nixon’s views and supported him.
On the 7th August the Secretary of State sanctioned an
advance on Kut.
On the 29th September, 1915, Kut-al-Amara was
occupied.
After pursuing the Turks through Kut, G.neral Nixon
on the 3rd October stated that he proposed to concentrate
at Aziziyeh, a good deal further up the river, with che
intention of opening the road to Baghdad, for which object
he considered his force was sufficient; and next day he
asked whether he was to be reinforced by a division from
France in order that his position at Baghdad might be
maintained.
The question of an advance on Baghdad now suddenly
came into prominence for the first time as a live possibility.
Much telegraphic correspondence between England,
India, and General Nixon ensued, until on the 23rd
October the Secretary of State wired to India that if
General Nixon was satisfied that the force he had available
was sufficient for the operation, he might march on Bagh
dad, and that two divisions would be sent to him as soon
as possible. On the 24th October this telegram was re
peated to General Nixon.
The effect of the indefinite policy underlying these three
phases was:—
While operations were confined to the vicinity of
Basra no special arrangements for the supply of river
craft were made, for they were not required. General
Barrett was asked on the 30th December, 1914, to report
the number of craft he would require in the event of an
advance, and his demands were completed by the end of
May, 1915.
While the change in policy underlying the advance to
Kut was under consideration, it was realised that the
river fleet would have to be augmented considerably by
vessels constructed in England and orders were placed
in August, 1915.
An indication of the attitude of the Home Government
at this time will be seen in the Secretary of State’s proposal
on the 7th September, 1915, that the number of steamers
ordered from Home should be reduced in view of the
probable towing capacity of the new naval gunboats,
which turned out to have no such capacity.
Later, when the impending arrival of large reinforce
ments to support the policy of an advance on Baghdad
demanded immediately large reinforcements of river craft,
any class of river vessel at all suited to the river had to
be taken up and despatched.
It is obvious that while the requirements in river craft
depended on decisions in regard to policy, and had to be
met from a distance, whether from India or home, ready
made or built to specification, supply could not keep pace
with rapid changes of policy.
This seems to have been lost sight of by the Commission
in their remarks in paragraph 85, which appear to have
reference to this third phase in particular.
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