'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎86v] (172/248)

166
Army Department, instead of the Chief of the General
Staff, so as to enable me to deal with their report in my
capacity as Army Member.
Throughout, and in their final form, the object of the
terms of reference was to assist me in determining where
there had been failure, what were the causes, and who was
to blame, in India or in Mesopotamia.
I have never read, nor do I now read, the Secretary of
State’s instructions and additions as in any way altering
the above original objects of the Commission.
3. The Commission have not followed the headings of
the terms of reference in their report, though they state
that the extension of these terms placed them at a great
disadvantage in their inquiries.
However that may be, the result is unfortunate, since
the Commission have departed from their terms of refer
ence and embarked upon criticisms of the preparations
for the campaign which were outside their purview, which
they had neither the time, knowledge, nor the qualifica
tions to discuss, and concerning which they did not'even
take the obvious and only just course of examining the
Heads of Branches at Army Headquarters, nor of discus
sing w'ith me, prior to the submission of their report, the
difficulties they had experienced in adherence to their
terms of reference.
In fact, the Commission have ended by reporting on
the past and present action of the Government of India
instead of carrying out their instructions to report to the
Secretary, Army Department, for the information of
myself, how certain definite arrangements had been carried
out.
4. The issues they raise require reply, but up to the
17th July the appendices containing the evidence are not
ready for examination, so that I cannot now deal with their
value ; nor does the report itself contain any explanation
of their methods of receiving and appraising the evidence
taken, except the general statement that the Commis
sioners regard the evidence given to them as confidential,
which in itself is an unusual condition to make when
assigning responsibility to officers by name for failure in
their professional duties.
5. Until, therefore, there has been time to examine the
evidence, I am not in a position to determine where the
responsibility for any administrative failure lies, in Mesopo
tamia or in India.
1 need not, however, wait for the evidence in order to
review' the policy w'hich directed the campaign, so far as
it is know r n in India, and w'hich w'ould determine the
standard and pace of preparation of the force and conse
quently the forecasts to be made.
It is especially desirable to do this at once as relevant
to those issues raised in the report which are outside the
terms of reference, and w'hich might be held to reflect
upon my performance of my duties as Commander-in-
Chief in India.
In this respect I have a two-fold outlook :—
(i) As director of my staff.
(ii) As supervisor of their work.
Later, when in possession of the evidence, it will be for
me to investigate the execution of my orders by the
Quartermaster-General’s Branch, the Royal Indian Marine,
and the Medical Services, which are the three Branches
of the Army Department concerned in the matter both
in Mesopotamia and in India.
6. In paragraph 55 of their report the Commission admit
they do not know what the intentions of His Majesty’s
Government were in regard to this campaign. They had
the fullest opportunity of ascertaining them, but did not
attempt to do so. Without such knowledge all accusa
tions of want of foresight are really worthless. I must
examine this point. I would preface my remarks by
saying (a) that before this war His Majesty’s Government
required India to be ready merely for a hill campaign
against a semi-civihsed enemy and for that alone, and
(b) that in the present struggle the general policy of the
Empire required that all our energies,commercial, financial,
manufacturing, and military, be directed towards the
strengthening of our position in Europe and the North
Sea. It follows that all expenditure, all utilisation of
manufacturing resources, and all interference with trade
and commerce not directly required by this object should
be reduced to the lowest possible limits, and that the
•touinment of forces not emcloyed in the main theatr-
should be limited to a basis calculated to enable them to
carrv out the settled policy of Government; and that it
would have been a w'aste of power to prepare upon a
speculative scale.
Everything in Mesopotamia, including medical arrange
ments, depended on the supply of river transport, and the
supply of this depended on foreknowledge of the policy
of His Majesty’s Government, both as to the geographical
points to be aimed at and the number of troops to be
employed. This involves an examination of the history
of the campaign.
In paragraph 5 of their report the Commission divide
the campaign in Mesopotamia into four phases, viz. :—
(i) The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra
and Kurna and the defeat at Shaiba or Bar-
jasiyah of the Turkish attempt to recapture
Basra.
(ii) The expulsion of the Turks from Persian Arabistan
followed by the occupation of Amara on the
Tigris, and of Nasariyeh on the Euphrates.
[For convenience, the later operations near
Nasariyeh have been included in this phase.]
(iii) The capture of Kut-al-Amara, advance to Ctesi-
phon and subsequent retreat to Kut.
(iv) The defence of Kut-al-Amara and the unsuccess
ful attempts to relieve it.
I shall now state the policy in each phase as known at
the time in India, and shall then explain the preparations
made in order to keep pace with this policy. Having
done this, those paragraphs of the Commission’s report
which express their views as to essential preparation for
the campaign will be compared with the facts.
It should be noted that, so far as pre-war consideration
of what might be necessary in any theatre of operations
north of Basra was concerned, this area was reserved for
the General Staff at the War Office, and India was not
allowed to collect intelligence or formulate plans thereon.
I received no plans of operation from the General Staff,
War Office.
7. Phase I.—The landing at Fao, the occupation of Basra
and Kurna and the defeat at Shaiba or Barjasiyah of the
Turkish attempt to recapture Basra.
The original policy of Government, as known to the
Government of India, did not contemplate an advance
into Mesopotamia beyond the vicinity of Basra.
On the 26th September, 1914, India was informed that
the situation as regards Turkey was most menacing and
was ordered to hold in readiness one brigade of the 6th
Division with two mountain batteries and sappers to
move to the head of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
On the 2nd October secret orders to despatch this force
w r ere received, their ostensible destination being Egypt,
and the transport and troops having sealed orders which
were not opened until at sea.
On the 5th October, 1914, India was informed that the
object of the expedition was to occupy Abadan and protect
the oil tanks and pipe line.
On the 1st November the Secretary of State for India
directed orders to be given for the force to attack Fao
and clear the Turks out of the Shatt-al-Arab, if possible
as far as Shamshumiya.
A second brigade of the 6th Division which had been
prepared and despatched under orders from His Majesty’s
Government, reinforced the advanced portion and occupied
Basra on November 22nd.
On the 23rd November, 1914, the Chief Political Officer
at Basra, in a private telegram, urged an advance on
Baghdad. This, however, was not supported in India.
On the 27th November the Secretary of State wired that
His Majesty’s Government were “ not disposed to authorise
an advance on Baghdad at present,” but authorised an
advance on Kurna.
On the 9th December, 1914, Kurna was occupied.
On the 14th December, 1914, the Secretary of State for
India proposed the occupation of Nasariyeh.
On the 2nd January, 1915, India wired home stating
military reasons against the movement to Nasariyeh ; and
on the 5th January, 1915, the Secretary of State agreed to
await developments.
On the 29th January, 1915, the Secretary of State urged
the sending of troops up the Karun at once for the protec -