'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎68r] (135/248)

133
APPENDIX I.
“ VINCENT-BINGLEY ” REPORT.
From
The COMMISSION APPOINTED to ENQUIRE INTO
the MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS in MESO
POTAMIA.
To
The SECRETARY to the GOVERNMENT of INDIA,
ARMY DEPARTMENT.
Simla.
June 29, 1916.
Sir,
In accordance with the instructions conveyed in your
letter No. H.-2418, dated March 31st, 1916, we have the
honour to submit the following report on the arrangements
made for the collection, treatment, and removal of the
sick and wounded during the recent operations in Meso
potamia. As the Government of India are aware, the
Commission, which was originally composed of two
members only (Sir William Vincent and Major-General
Bingley), was first appointed by His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief on March 2nd, 1916, with directions
to enquire into the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia
during and subsequent to January, 1916, and to report
the conclusions arrived at to the Chief of the General
Staff.
2. On receipt of these orders the Commissioners then
appointed proceeded at once to Bombay, where a number
of sick and wounded who had recently come from Meso
potamia were detained in hospital. Several of the
hospitals in Bombay were visited, and various witnesses
were examined, many of whom, however, could not be
questioned at any great length in the time available,
as they were just about to sail for England in the hospital
steamer “ Assaye.” After completing as far as possible
their enquiries at Bombay, the Commissioners went to
Basra and continued their investigations there. At this
stage of the proceedings the terms of reference were
modified so as to include in the scope of the enquiry the
medical arrangements made for the campaign during
the last four months of 1915. From Basra the Com
missioners proceeded to Amara, 135 miles up the Tigris.
There they recorded the statements of various witnesses,
and inspected the arrangements made for the reception
and accommodation of the wounded at the different
hospitals. After finishing their investigations at Amara,
they travelled by river steamer up the Tigris to Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. ,
about 270 miles from Basra, where the headquarters of
the Tigris Force were encamped. Here fresh evidence
was recorded, the arrangements for accommodating sick
and wounded were further investigated, and the Com
missioners had an opportunity of testing, by personal
observation, how far the arrangements for the evacuation
of the wounded from the battlefield to the field ambu
lances and hospitals at Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. were satisfactory. From
Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. the Commissioners returned to Basra, where revised
instructions were received from the Government of
India. A copy of the letter and of the enclosure con
taining these instructions is annexed to this report.
These instructions made the following important changes
in the terms of reference :—
(a) Mr. E. A. Ridsdale was appointed a member of
the Commission.
(b) The Commission was directed to report the result
of its enquiry to the Government of India.
(c) The scope of the enquiry w^as extended, so as to
include the whole of the operations in Meso
potamia from November, 1914, up to date.
(C 48—176)
(d) The Commission was directed not only to enquire
into the adequacy of the medical arrangements,
but was instructed to ascertain and assign
responsibility for any defects found and to state
whether individuals or the system were to
blame.
The addition of a new member at this stage placed the
Commission in a difficult position, as by this time Sir
William Vincent and Major-General Bingley had examined
more than 130 witnesses and had completed their investi
gations up the Tigris. The inclusion of the earlier
operations in the scope of the enquiry added a further
complication. The enquiries hitherto made had been
confined to operations subsequent to September, 1915,
although many of the witnesses examined could have
given evidence of value on previous phases of the cam
paign. By this time, moreover, two of the Commis
sioners had realised the difficulty of obtaining definite
and accurate evidence on the detailed points referred
to them, in respect of the operations of September,
October, and November, 1915, as many of those intimately
connected with this portion of the campaign w'ere either
besieged in Kut-el-Amara, or had left the country. The
difficulty of securing such evidence in regard to still
earlier operations was even greater, and it was clear
that it would not be possible in many cases to ascertain
all the details required by the reference, such for instance
as the forecast of preparations considered necessary prior
to each action. For these reasons, we asked that the
terms of reference might be amended so as to require
us to report on actions prior to Ctesiphon in general
terms. This request was refused. We wish, therefore,
to state that in dealing with the multiplicity of detail
apparent in the report, we are necessarily dependent
upon the memory of the witnesses for the accuracy of
particular statements. A more serious complication
arising from this amendment relates to a question of
principle, in that it involved the examination of the
medical arrangements of the whole expedition. The
medical organisation of a force is an integral part of
its military organisation, and cannot be considered apart
from the latter. We have, therefore, at times found it
impossible to examine the working of the medical organi
sation without at the same time criticising other arrange
ments w hich, though not under the control of the medical
authorities, indirectly affected the well-being of the sick
and wounded. We have endeavoured to avoid this as
much as possible, but we have, throughout our enquiries,
realised the difficulty of carrying out any comprehensive
investigation of medical arrangements as apart from the
general military organisation. It is true that any enquiry
into the medical arrangements of the winter of 1915-16
would not have been entirely free from this difficulty,
but except as regards transport, the causes which led
to the breakdown at that period were largely of a tempo
rary and local character, being due to unforeseen circum
stances rather than to radical defects in organisation.
3. On receipt of these instructions the necessity of a
second tour up the Tigris was carefully considered, and
after discussion it w r as decided that Mr. Ridsdale should
proceed to Amara to see the state of affairs there for
himself and to collect further evidence, and that the other
two members of the Commission should go up the
Euphrates to Nasariyeh and continue their enquiries
there. In pursuance of this decision, Mr. Ridsdale
proceeded to Amara on May 5th, and Sir William Vincent
and Major-General Bingley went to Nasariyeh. The
S