'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎67r] (133/248)

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r and place 'even a few Regular troops in a position of immeasurable superiority. Further
more, during a great war, the power of ruthless repression—falling on the just as well
as on the unjust—is little likely to be too closely scrutinised, and adds greatly to the
decisive power of the Executive.
Attitude displayed in other ways.
45. In any case it does not appear that the objection to the denuding of India of troops
can be an excuse for the attitude of the Indian Government displayed in other matters.
Danger in India cannot account for the want of energy shown in India, for. the non-
mobilisation of industry, for the selfish financial attitude, for the objection to building a
Tigris railway (two-foot six-inches gauge) because “ progress on railways in this country
'(India) would have to be stopped,” for the reluctance to use British Territorials, for the
want of touch with their own expedition, for the ignorant advice given as regards the
advance on Bagdad. Nor even can it account for the medical breakdown, since surely
the actual needs of an army in the field must come before the problematic needs of an
army on the frontier. It would appear that, in fact, the Army Administration in India
was jealous of the Army at home ; they wished to retain the magnitude of their command ;
they felt they were neglected, “ out of the picture,” and they determined, perhaps un
consciously, to be obstructive. It will be unfortunate if an attitude of this sort is passed
over.
Attitude a Calamity.
46. Such an attitude is held unpatriotic in a private citizen ; it is worse than un
patriotic in a British official; and in men in the positions occupied by Lord Hardinge
and Sir Beauchamp Duff it has been a calamity for England.
FINDINGS.
47. I find that, throughout the tenure of office of Lord Hardinge, the Government
of India showed little desire to help and some desire actually to obstruct the successful
prosecution of the war.
48. I find that the responsibility for the Mesopotamian failure of 1915-16 rests
principally on the Government of India, in that they gave ill-informed advice and did
not throw themselves and the resources of India into the energetic conduct of the war.
49. I find that the Government of India consisted in fact of the Viceroy, Lord
Hardinge of Penshurst, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Beauchamp Duff.
50. I find that no blame should be attributed to anyone, civil or military, in this
country for the initiation, consideration or sanction of the advance to Bagdad in 1915.
I am equally convinced that the delay caused by the consideration of the advance in this
country did not retard or adversely affect in any way the chances of that advance.
51. I find that the advance on Bagdad failed because the transport was insufficient
and the force ill-found.
52. I find that the relief of Kut failed because the transport was insufficient and
the force ill-found.
53. I find that the troops maintained the best traditions of the Service, that the
generalship at the front was fair, but that General Townshend alone inspired in his men
that confidence and devotion without which victories such as the first battle of Kut
and Ctesiphon are impossible.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
1. Steps should be taken at once to put the Indian Army under the control of the
War Office in Whitehall. During the conduct of a world war it is essential that there
should be unity of control. To have an army in India (or an army in Egypt) independent
of the orders of the War Office must lead to inefficiency. I, and I believe all my colleagues,
were impressed very much with the energy displayed by the War Office directly they took
over the control of the Army in Mesopotamia, and with the rapid improvement in the
efficiency of that force. The same energy applied to the Army in India might yet provide
p* us with new units and increased material from that country with its 315,000,000 inhabi
tants. The objections that were raised to such control by Sir Beauchamp Duff early in
• the war can no longer carry weight.