'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎56r] (111/248)

PART XI.—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE ERRORS OF £-09
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
A f*
F. Secretiveness and Lack of Co-ordination of Staffs.
transporting such new forces could be met. General Nixon stated that Staff confer'ncea
were frequently held, but notwithstanding this, we have evidence that reticence was carried
so far, that important Staff Officers were kept in ignorance of impending mov- v nts,
and were consequently unable to make in time the requisite preparations.
51. Commander Hamilton who was Principal Marine Transport Officer from the begin
ning of the campaign until December, 1915, and, who was uneasy from the first as to the
river transport situation, complained to us that the policy of the campaign was kept secret
from him. At the outset of the campaign he made a proposal for providing river steamers
in advance. This was not entertained by the staff at the time, and as he was not taken
into their confidence as to the future movements of the expedition, he did not afte wards
again press his proposal. In May, 1915, the Deputy-Director of Ordnance complained
that he was never given information as to projected movements of troops. In th«- spring
of the same year, Colonel Dallas, when Base Supply Officer at Basra, received no warning
that his responsibilities were to be doubled by the arrival of a second division of remfor- e-
ments. He was not informed when advances were to be made, and he understood mat
other high administrative officers were also kept without sufficient information. Similarly
General Davison, Inspector General of Lines of Communication, did not remember
being referred to at all in connection with the transport necessary for the advance of
General Townshend’s force towards Baghdad. Nor was he consu ted as to the provision
of transport for the promised reinforcements of two divisions, until after the advance
had been sanctioned, although it will be remembered that the availability of these divisions
as reinforcements at Baghdad was a condition precedent to the sanction by the authorities
of the advance on that place.
- f
52. Information as to the arrival of these reinforcemants was withheld until the
beginning of November from so high an officer as General Cowper, the Deputy-Adjutant
and Quartermaster-General in Mesopotamia, and even then he was not allowed for some
time to communicate it to his administrative officers,• with the result, as General Cowper
admitted under cross-examination, that there was delay in making preparations for the
reception of the reinforcements at Basra. According to General Cowper’s evidence the
. reason given for keeping him in ignorance of the prospective arrival of reinforcements was
fear that the news might reach the Turks, and that they would in consequence retreat !
without fighting. i
53. Surgeon-General Hathaway, the Director of Medical Services in Mesopotamia,
also contended that he was hampered in his work by his exclusion from the Staff Con
ferences. General Nixon disputed this, but we are convinced that, whether with or
without General Nixon’s knowledge, secrecy as to projected movements was maintained
by the Staff to an extent detrimental to the interests of the expedition.
54. We can quite understand, in a country so full of rumour and spying as Mesopo
tamia, the necessity of confining to as few people as possible information concerning
impending movements and requirements ; but the stoppage of information was pushed
to such a point that the officers, upon whose arrangements the success of the new move
largely depended, were sometimes only given information after a decision had been taken.
We have no evidence to show that a conference of any kind took place before General
Nixon informed the Viceroy that he could open the road to Baghdad. General Nixon •
throughout acted solely upon his own responsibility. As one of his subordinates stated, he
“ revelled in responsibility ”—a fine quality in a soldier and one which ought to be
encouraged, but it cannot stand alone, and in the present instance this dash and audacity
were not sufficiently associated with prescient preparation or with investigation of the
difficulties to be overcome.
55. At Simla, Sir Beauchamp Duff, as Commander-in-Chief, was in absolute and
untrammelled control over every branch of military administration. The General Staff
was in no sense a separate or independent branch. The chief of that body was personally
under the Gommander-in-Chief and part of his staff. The other holders of high office,
such as the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Director-General of Operations,
were all under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief, as was formerly the case
in the War Office at home.