'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎55v] (110/248)

108 PART XL—CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO' THE ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT AND SHORTCOMINGS OF RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES.
E. Sir John Nixon’s Appointment, Instructions and Staff.
Basra, if their defensive position was to be consolidated and made secure. Sir John Nixon
had the reputation of a successful and dashing Cavalry Officer. He told us in his evidence
that he believed he was sent out in order that he might make this change m the attitude
of our forces around Basra. He took with him a new Staff.
45. The change by an expeditionary force from defensive to offensive tactics may,
under certain conditions, be possible without necessitating fundamental changes in the
organisation of the force or in the base and line of communications. In Mesopotamia,
if the offensive was pushed beyond a certain point, its success or failure was almost entirely
governed by the extent to which the capacity of the port of Basra, and of the commumc a-
tions with it, were simultaneously developed.
46. This self-evident necessity was never realised either by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. at
home or the Government at Simla until it was too late. It is no exaggeration to say that
this was an undertaking utterly beyond the capacity of Sir John Nixon and his staff.
To impose upon a Cavalrv Officer with little more than the ordinary staff of a Division,,
such a duty was to try him altogether beyond his experience and strength.
47. The instructions to Sir John Nixon to prepare a scheme for an advance on Baghdad
revolutionised the whole foundation and organisation of an expedition initiated and founded
for much smaller and more limited objects, and this was neither recognised b} Sir J.
Nixon nor those wlio so instructed him. He looked at the matter from a purely fighting
point of view, and the militarv successes which he had achieved induced him to under
estimate the full risk involved in an advance from Ivut to Baghdad. The Government of
India never seemed to question his discretion or his want of experience of a campaign
dependent on river transport. Implicit confidence in his judgment was the basis of their
communications to the Home Government.
48. It was not merelv that, through no fault of their own, Sir John Nixon s staff were
unequal to the task of creating a practically new port, but they were seriously handicapped in
the very important work of obta ining reliable intelligence as to the strength of their opponents.
The armies against which Sir John Nixon was operating were recruited and drawn from a
vast area of territory extending from Persia to Bulgaria and from Aden to Erzerum. The
military movements inside this vast extent of country were very difficult to follow, and
the sources of information were such that London was better supplied with news than
Simla or Basra, as nearly the whole of this area was within the scope of the Intelligence
organisation of the War Office. The local area from which Sir John Nixon’s Intelligence
Staff obtained information was limited, and did not comprise those portions of the Turkish
Empire from which reinforcements to Irak could be sent. Sir John Nixon, having
confidence in his own staff, was not disposed to subordinate their information to that
which came from outside.
I 49. Upon the two essential considerations governing the attempt to capture Baghdad
| Sir J. Nixon was therefore seriously at fault. He underrated the difficulty of transporting
reinforcements, as they arrived, from the port of embarkation to the scene of action, and
he seriously under-estimated the number of his opponents and miscalculated the dates at
which thev would arrive. Sufficient allowance was not made either in London or Simla for
the probahility of such miscalculations. The extreme difficulty of the first task and the
lack of reliable information do not seem to have been properly appreciated by those con
trolling the conduct of the campaign. But though grave blame must be attached to
Sir John Nixon for his excessive optimism, those who shared in that optimism cannot
be wholly free from criticism.
F. Secretiveness and Lack of Co-ordination of Staffs.
50. The character and scope of the task imposed upon General Nixon and his
Staff made it one of exceptional difficulty, and it might have been assumed that
there would have been full and frequent interchange of opinion between the Head
quarters and the Administrative Staffs of the Army in Mesopotamia before any fresh move
was made or, if reinforcements were expected, as to how the difficulties of maintaining and