'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎43v] (86/248)

84 PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
E. Responsibility of Secretary of State, Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
take advantage of it. Much voluntary assistance is being afforded from private sources in all directions in
India. Money is ample and sufficient for supplying comforts for sick and wounded in Mesopotamia and in
India. Voluntary aid societies here are doing all that is necessary. Climatic and other conditions render it
undesirable to employ personnel of such societies in Mesopotamia. Arrangements have been made to provide
lady nurses from India, as it is considered that the climatic and other conditions permit. My Government
arranged for doctors and medicines.”
By way of comment on the last sentence, we would note that only a fortnight later,
Surgeon-General Hathaway informed India of a deficiency in his authorised establishment,
amounting to 17 medical officers, and 50 Sub-Assistant Surgeons, a deficiency which was
never completely made up during 1915.
83. On October 9th the Secretary of State telegraphed again, expressing anxiety as to
the health of Force D ” and especially about precautions in the hospitals against malaria
and the general provision about tropical diseases- Lord Hardinge replied to the Secre
tary of State’s telegram on October 15th, giving details of the precautions that were being
taken in Mesopotamia against heat-stroke, malaria and dysentery. I he information that
was put at his disposal seems not to have been as complete as could be wished :
“ Preventives adopted are purification of water by clarifying and boiling o chlorination, prophylactic
issue of quinine, treatment of mosquito breeding places, supply to all troops, British and native, of mosquito
nets. A sanitarv committee for whole force has been formed. . . . British and Indian General Hospitals
at Basra are provided with electric lights and fans and each bed has a mosquito net, but buildings are not
suitable for use of gauze netting.”
The water supplied in Mesopotamia at this time was very far from being satisfactory,
nor was the provision of electric lights, fans and mosquito nets so complete as Lord
Hardinge’s telegram would suggest.
84. On October 14th Mr. Chamberlain wrote in a private letter as follows :—
“ I am most reluctant to appear to convey to you or the Commander-in-Chief any mistrust of the arrange
ments made by the medical authorities for the troops in Mesopotamia, but owing to reports which have reached
me I felt it necessary to telegraph an enquiry as to the fulness of the precautions which had been taken. . . .
I know that the difficulties must be great, and that it is impossible to foresee every contingency, but I trust
that vou will impress upon all concerned that in this matter of health they cannot take too many precautions,
and that we shall not question expenditure required to,safeguard the lives of our men.
85. On October 29th Mr. Chamberlain wrote again :—
“ I continue to receive from Members of Parliament and others anxious enquiries about the health of
the troops in Mesopotamia and the provision made for them. Inter alia, I have been sent a letter from some
officer there in which he incidentally observes that my statement as to ice and other comforts provided at the
base hospital ‘ was all eyewash.’ I cannot go behind your assurance that all that is necessary and possible
ig being done, and you yourself are necessarily dependent on the reports of the military ; but you will
remember how we received the same assurances from military and medical authorities at the time of the
South African War, and yet how much more might, after all, have been done—at any rate, in the early days
of that campaign. As we must now look forward not only to a prolonged occupation of Mesopotamia, but
to having increased numbers of troops there, I beg that you will take all the steps in your power to stimulate
the ingenuity of the medical authorities in making provision for their health and for the comfort of the sick.
No expense ought to be allowed to stand in the way of the best provision that science can suggest.’
86. On December 3rd Mr. Chamberlain wrote again in very strong terms
“ You know how anxious I am about the health of our forces in Mesopotamia. Apart from all feelings
of humanity and the duty we owe to those who are giving their lives, men are too precious to be wasted.
“ I wish to make all allowances for difficulties, perhaps only partly perceived by me, and not known to
mv correspondents, but I am very uneasy about the reports that reach me. . . .
“ I beg you not to be content with easy assurances. On your advice, comforts, &c., are not being sent
from here, and we shall have no defence if all that is possible is not done.”
It is clear that these letters ought to have led to searching enquiries into the sufficiency
of medical provisions in Mesopotamia.
87. As is natural at this distance of time, Lord Hardinge’s recollection was not very
distinct as to'the precise steps he took in consequence of these communications from Mr.
Chamberlain. But we have no doubt that he communicated to the Commander-in-Chief
at any rate in substance, what Mr. Chamberlain had written. We are afraid there can
equally be no doubt that the Commander-in-Chief and his staff did not respond to his repre
sentations with the zeal that the occasion required.
88. The only criticism to be made upon Lord Hardinge in the matter is that, wielding
tne supreme authority of Viceroy, he should have forced the Army Department to do
more than it did. He wrote as late as February 18th, 1916, in a private letter to Mr.
Chamberlain this significant sentence:—“ I may mention here that I have at last succeeded